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CHAIRMAN PATRICK JOHNSTON: It's now 2:30. We had 
scheduled our hearing at 2:00 p.m. Due to Assembly session 
running late, we were unable to convene at 2:00. Members have 
just returned to their offices, and I'm sure some of them will be 
joining us, but I believe in the interests of time and the 
convenience of the witnesses and other interested parties, we 
should begin. 
This hearing will, of course, be taped, and eventually a 
transcript will be provided and will be available to the public. 
The hearing also, for those of you unfamiliar with the Capitol, is 
heard in every office of the Capitol on the squawk box, for those 
who are interested. 
I'm Patrick Johnston, Chairman of the Assembly Finance 
and Insurance Committee. 
The purpose of this afternoon's hearing is to study the 
sale of American Continental Corporation subordinate debentures to 
Lincoln Savings and Loan customers with the goal of potentially 
seeking legislation to address some of the problems we will hear 
about today. 
American Continental Corporation sold subordinate 
debentures, unsecured low payment priority debt instruments, at 
branches of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association. The debentures 
were sold directly to Lincoln customers, and others, by American 
Continental Association employees. 
The debentures were not underwritten. The prospectus 
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states that without underwriting, purchasers of the instruments 
did not have the benefit of an independent investigation of the 
type customarily performed by underwriters and that the debentures 
would be difficult to resell because of the lack of a secondary 
market. 
The prospectus also indicated that Lincoln Savings, 
American Continental's subsidiary and principal asset, had moved 
away from traditional mortgage lending and into riskier loans and 
investments. There was concern among regulators about the 
activities of Lincoln Savings. 
The debentures were qualified for sale in California by 
the Department of Corporations. The lease of space in Lincoln 
Branches to American Continental for the sales of debentures was 
approved by the Department of Savings and Loan. 
On April 14, 1989, Lincoln Savings was placed into 
conservatorship by regulators, and on August 3, 1989, it was taken 
over by federal regulators. On April 13, 1989, American 
Continental sought reorganization under the bankruptcy laws. 
These events may have rendered the subordinated debentures nearly 
worthless. 
Some holders of the debentures are contending that they 
were misled as to the true character of these instruments. 
Customers seeking to put funds into COs may have been steered to 
the riskier subordinate debentures with cla being made that 




We are here today to accept testimony about these 
allegations and events. 
On August 15 of this year, we invited Mr. Charles 
Keating Jr., Chairman of American Continental Corporation, to 
testify, but we have received no response after several attempts 
to contact Mr. Keating. We have tried to secure as witnesses 
persons who worked for Lincoln Savings or American Continental and 
who sold or have knowledge of the sales of the debentures, but 
have so far been unsuccessful as well. Contacts with the FDIC 
about interviewing Lincoln employees have not proved fruitful 
either. We may have to schedule, therefore, another hearing to 
seek further information and give those persons not present an 
opportunity to testify before us. 
Given the investigative nature of this hearing, we will 
follow what has become our customary practice and ask Legislative 
Counsel to advise the witnesses and also to swear them in as they 
come up to present their testimony. 
I'd like, if we could, to have the witnesses stand in 
their place, if they're in the hearing room at the present time. 
Mr. William Powell, Ms. Leah Kane, Mr. Joseph Cotchett, Mr. 
Franklin Tom, Mr. William Crawford, Mr. William Davis, Ms. 
Christine Bender. 
Mr. Miller. 
MR· ROBERT MILLER: There are provisions in the 
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Government Code which specify the rights witnesses, as as 
their responsibilities, when they make appearances before 
legislative Committees, and I'm going to read you a statement from 
the Government Code which this Committee is required to read to 
you under certain circumstances. 
Section 9410 of the Government Code provides that a 
person sworn and examined before the Senate, Assembly, or a 
legislative Committee cannot be held to answer criminally or be 
subject criminally to any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or 
act touching which he or she is required to testify, other than 
for perjury committed in testifying or contempt. 
However, this Committee will not require your testimony. 
The Committee does not wish to be placed in a position where it 
can be claimed that you received immunity from any possible 
criminal prosecution because of your testimony before this 
Committee. 
Because you are not being given immunity from criminal 
prosecution, you have a constitutional right to refuse to testify 
before this Committee. If you desire to waive this right and to 
testify voluntarily, you will be given that opportunity subject to 
all of the following conditions: If you do not wish to answer any 
question, you will so state. In the absence of such a statement, 
your answer to each question will be entirely voluntary. If you 
choose to testify, you will be sworn under oath and will be 
therefore subject to criminal prosecution for perjury committed in 
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testifying. If you choose to so testify voluntarily, you are 
reminded that any self-incriminating statements you make can be 
used against you in criminal proceedings. 
Mr. Johnston. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you. Our first witness is Mr. 
Powell, Mr. Miller. 
HR. MILLER: Mr. Powell, did you understand the 
statement I just read? Do you agree to testify voluntarily under 
those stated conditions? Would you raise your hand then? Do you 
solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this 







Would you state your name for the record. 
William Marshall Powell, P-0-W-E-L-L, full 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In the interest of efficiency, I'm 
going to ask Ms. Kane and Mr. Cotchett to come up to the witness 
table as well, at this time, and ask them to be sworn in as well, 
and since their testimony is on the same area of concern, we can 
do this as a panel more efficiently, I believe. 
MR. MILLER: I have to ask both of you if you understood 
the statements that I read regarding your rights as a witness? 
HR. COTCHETT: I did. 





MS. KANE: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Do you agree to testify voluntarily under 
those conditions? 
MS. KANE: Yes, I do. 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise your hand? Mr. Cotchett? 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about 
to give the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth? 
MS . KANE AND MR. COTCHETT: I do . 
MR. MILLER: Okay. Will you state your name for the 
record. 
MR. COTCHETT: Joseph W. Cotchett, Attorney at Law, 
Burlingame, California. 
MS. KANE: Mine is Leah F. Kane, Laguna Hills, 
California, Leisure World. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. Thank you very much for being 
here with us today, Mr. Powell, Ms. Kane, Mr. Cotchett. 
Mr. Powell, we'd like to invite you if you would speak 
into that microphone. No, the one standing there. With these 
microphones, normally, you have to get pretty close and speak up 
so that people can be heard. 
We'd like for you to tell the Committee of your 
experience in the decision to purchase subordinate debentures 
through Lincoln Savings. 
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MR. WILLIAM POWELL: I moved into Laguna Hills Leisure 
World where Lincoln Savings is located in 1974. The Lincoln 
Savings was about as close to a bank that we could get, near 
Multon Parkway, so I put a checking account first, and then I put 
other CDs and what not in, and about -- I got acquainted with all 
the operators and the manager, very nice people, very thoughtful, 
so about four years ago, 1986, the Continental Corporation had a 
young lady, who looked like the rest of the entourage, sitting at 
the desk adjacent to the teller's cages. She had the brochures. 
I took one home, read it, thought it sounded pretty good. It had 
different dates that the maturity dates were a couple of years 
after that, and another three years. 
So I decided to pull some of the money out of my CDs and 
other things I had in the Lincoln Savings, and, of course, they 
gave me, way back, a box there for free. So it looked pretty 
good. In fact, they didn't force me or try to rape me, but they 
just gave me the material, talked to my wife, and we said, "Well, 
let's go for it." 
So my first debenture was on 12/29/86. I had a 
certificate in blue. I have with me, actually, they had a blue 
color. The numbers are -- 144 for $2,000. My first debenture, 
that day, the same day they said, "Well, it might be a good idea 
to take one for two years, one for three years, to stagger the 
outgoing date, the maturity date." 




out for $5,000, which was number 22 on blue background paper. 
Now, last year -- well, I haven't lived down there for two and a 
half years. We moved to the "Gold Country" in '87, up in Grass 
Valley, and I've moved now to Vacaville because I wanted to be 
near Kaiser -- but anyhow, on 10/5/88, my wife and I went down to 
Orange County-- Well, I'm a lawn bowler. We stopped by her 
sister's place in Burbank, and anyhow, we bought two more 
certificates August 5, 1988: Number 304, brown in color, $6,000; 
we also bought Number 280 for $4,000. Total amount, $17,000 that 
we invested. 
That was my dealing, different people, of course. They 
have remodeled the bank and there are different ~anagers. I have 
all the names of the two or three people who sold or were at 
desks. They were females, actually, that I dealt with each 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You were a customer of Lincoln 
Savings, then, for some years before. 
MR. POWELL: Right. Since '74 when we moved down there 
from L.A. County. I worked in L.A. Unified School District for 32 
years, and when I retired we moved down there near my father and 
mother. They moved there in '64. 
Anyhow, we went to the nearest bank. They looked real 
good and they were very accommodating ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So you were a regular customer then 
at Lincoln, and then at a point in time in 1986, you decided to 
avail yourself of the opportunity to invest in these subordinate 
- 8 -
000012., 
debentures. How did your attention become drawn to the sale of 
those debentures? 
Could you speak into the microphone? 
MR. POWELL: Well, the Continental brochures were very 
colorful. The young lady at the desk, she was sitting there 
facing out there, and she just said, "Hi," and so on, and I said, 
"What have you got here?" and she said, "A new investment deal 
where you can make a little bit better money, more percentage than 
you do on your COs or checking account." 
So I took the brochures, read them over. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did you take them home? 
MR. POWELL: Yes, I did. But as I say, a lot of this 
stuff, I know, since I've been a teacher, a lot of the stuff is 
put in by different companies besides this one here, and other 
things, in advertising, whatever, merchandising, and they put the 
fine print at the bottom. If you can't read it, you've been 
raped. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you recall that you were given a 
prospectus? 
MR. POWELL: Yes. I got the prospectus from the 
they had a regular -- well, it was quite a good size, like the 
folder we had there, a big one. They had a small one too. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So you went home and reviewed that 
with your wife; is that correct? 
MR. POWELL: Right. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And when you did, did you become 
aware at that time that the investment was not insured? 
MR. POWELL: No. I didn't. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Were you advised by the salesperson 
that there was not any FSLIC insurance? 
MR. POWELL: Not at all on that. I figured, you know, 
you figure that the S&L is doing a nice job with you and you've 
been trusting them for ten years or more. I figured they're going 
into this it'd be the same deal, you know. In other words, I was 
trusting them to be secure and honest as they were. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Were you relying on the general 
health, as you believed it, of the savings and loan or did you 
believe that the instrument was insured, backed by the federal 
government? 
MR. POWELL: Well, the gals that I dealt with the first 
time, and last year, at the desk there appeared to be -- I thought 
they were employees of Lincoln Savings. They were not outsiders. 
They were strictly in-house employees, although they weren't 
dressed up in costumes or whatever or hats on, and so on. They 
were -- strictly looked like the background of the whole S&L. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And so then, over a period of time, 
you invested about $16,000. 
MR. POWELL: $17,000. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Then what happened? 
MR. POWELL: Well, then we thought we were secure 
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because I invested the last part last October, less than a year 
ago when I was down there, and I didn't suspect that the people 
who were in -- had taken over Lincoln actually -- were now the 
parent company, were so crooked. I'd never been done that way in 
my life. I had accounts way back when I was eighteen, in B of A, 
you name it. I've had them. Other things too. COs, and 
whatever, but I never have been taken by people who look honest 
and truthful, and they didn't look like crooks at all who sold the 
things. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: At what point did you come to 
realize that you had unsecured debt instruments? 
MR. POWELL: Well, when I saw it in the paper, actually, 
I got -- I forget when it was, but toward the end of last year, I 
saw that Lincoln Savings and this part of it was going in to be 
taken over by the feds. So I immediately I was living up in 
Grass Valley at that time, and I had other banks I used up there 
also, down there, and near the Lincoln Savings. 
So I wrote to Lincoln Savings, because I wasn't sure 
whether they were going down the tubes or not. 
I didn't have too much in my checking account. 
I said, "Please send me and close my checking account" 
--and I had another account, something-- "immediately," and they 
did. So I got my money, I think about $5,000 in the checking 
account out within a week of the time I asked for it, so there's 




The other, I couldn't prevent. I couldn't say, "Please 
send me the money from my $17,000." I had no control, but I did 
get my four or five thousand out of Lincoln. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: One of the things that -- Mr. 
Powell, of course, is important here is to what extent you 
misunderstood or were misled as to what these bonds really 
represented and therefore your recollection of how these bonds 
were sold to you is of ultimate importance. 
MR. POWELL: Well, when I first bought them, I thought 
it was -- Well, I knew Continental Corporation was going to be 
part of the whole deal. I didn't know at that time that they were 
not doing the right things. I didn't know who took over, really, 
but I figured back in '86 that that was a very good investment. I 
think the first was for two years and another for one year, so a 
continuous cycle. The ones I bought last year were also two 
years. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Would you have made the investment 
if you had known that they were not as secure as a certificate of 
deposit? 
MR. POWELL: I would not. No. I'm very conservative. 
Always have been, and I play it close to the chest on that. 
So I would not have, like stocks, I don't deal in stocks 
or marginal stuff or buying on whatever. The only stock I've ever 
owned was when I got it as a teenager. My dad bought Edison 
- 12 -
stock, $500. Finally I converted that into money, although it's a 
good deal, but I needed money so I took that out. So I wouldn't 
ever go to a horse race or anything else, or to Las Vegas. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You said you're very conservative 
but you worked for L.A. Unified for a period of time. Those 
aren't inconsistent, are they? (laughter). 
MR. POWELL: I taught 32 years before I retired in 1975. 
The reason I retired was because I-5 became gridlocked. I had to 
go to East L.A. and I had to get up at 5:00 in the morning. If I 
didn't, and had breakfast there and call the office, I'd never get 
there. I would come back at 2:00, and I was supervisor of three 
high schools. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Powell, I'm sure that this has 
been drawn to your attention over the course of this unfortunate 
experience, but the prospectus does say in bold print, "The 
debentures being offered are the sole obligation of the company 
and are not being offered as a savings account or deposits and are 
not insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation." 
MR. POWELL: That's the fine print we didn't read, 
although I thought because Lincoln -- If Lincoln had sold out 
through some "X" corporation, I would have said, "Well, how are 
they doing?" but being as Lincoln is still in the picture, you 
trust Lincoln or Bank of America or whoever. They didn't say, I 
wasn't told that this is a shaky deal, that it's a good 
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investment. I said, Well, it looks real good." We 't just 
sign up the first time I saw the brochure. It was probably a 
month or two or three later. In fact, it was, because we probably 
saw them in June of '86 and we bought on the 29th of December, so 
it was 6 months after. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you very much Mr. Powell. You 
can stay there, and we may have other questions, but we appreciate 
your testimony. 
Ms. Kane. 
MR. POWELL: I'll stay right here. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Sure. Ms. Kane, thank you for being 
with us. If you could share with the Committee your experience in 
becoming aware of the subordinate debentures sold at Lincoln 
Savings and your decision to purchase them. 
IS. LEAH KANE: My name is Leah Kane. I now live in 
Leisure World in Laguna Hills, California. I moved there a little 
over a year ago from Los Angeles. I made the move because my 
fiancee suddenly died, and I needed to get into new surroundings. 
I needed the change. 
Anyway, I had an account in a Los Angeles bank in 
amount of $25,000, which represented most of my retirement, and 
was very inconvenient for me to have money in another bank so far 
away because I don't get into Los Angeles very often any more. I 
decided that I wanted to find a bank in Laguna Hills nearby so 
that I could put this money into a CD or a money account, 
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particularly a CD. 
Anyway, my cousin lives in Leisure World, and she banks 
in Lincoln Savings just as a savings account, and she said, "You 
know, I've been doing business with Lincoln for a number of years, 
and they're such nice people. It's a neighborhood bank. I would 
say that half the people in Leisure World bank in Lincoln Savings. 
They're very nice people. I've never had any trouble," and when I 
lived in Los Angeles, I used to watch Lincoln Savings growing in 
their branches. I was particular interested in their financial 
reports, so I used to check the newspapers quite frequently and 
see these figures, and I thought, "Well, this sounds like a very 
good bank. I think that's what I'm going to do. It's convenient. 
I shop at Hughes Market, which is a few doors away, and I can do 
. I 
my banking nearby." And then, friends of mine in Leisure World 
also spoke very highly of Lincoln Savings and their good -- good 
things about them. 
So I went in there with my $25,000, and I said, "I'd 
like to speak to somebody who works for Lincoln in customer 
service," and they said, "Fine, Ms. Kane. Just have a seat over 
at this desk," which was in Lincoln Savings bank, "and I'll call 
over a girl who works for Lincoln Savings in customer account, and 
she'll help you." 
So the young lady came over. I told her, I said, "I 
have $25,000. I'm a new customer. I need the interest on this 
money to live on, and what can you offer me?" 
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She said, "Oh," she said, "Why don't you spl 
Why put all $25,000 into a savings account or a CD or money 
market?" She says, "You know, we're paying a very good rate of 
interest on American Continental Debenture bonds," and I said, 
"Well, what kind of interest are you paying?" She said, "Well, up 
to about 10%." And she says, "Right now, we can give you nine and 
three quarters, if you want to put half into a money market and 
half of it into a bond," and she said, "Lincoln Savings is behind 
this. It's very secure. You have nothing to worry about. It's a 
very good investme~t, and we'll give you monthly interest on 
this," and she said, "I know you'll be very happy with it." And 
she says, "In fact, I have a brochure here, and Mr. Keating is a 
chairman of the board of American Continental. He's a very fine 
gentleman. He owns many enterprises. We're into insurance, and 
we're into shopping markets, and so forth and so on, and we just 
built, Mr. Keating just built a $200 million hotel." She , 
"In fact, Jane over here just came back from Mr. Keating's 
Phoenician hotel, and I'd like her to tell you about this fine 
hotel." 
So she came over and she said, "Well, I have never seen 
anything like this. This hotel was like a castle." She said, "I 
stayed there. They paid for my vacation. They wanted me to see 
what it was like so I could come back and tell the customers about 
it," and she said, "It's just absolutely beautiful. It's a $200 
million hotel. It's partly built, but 's 50% occupied already 
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and 's just We have people waiting to get a 
reservation here." 
So the customer service person started to write up 
things and then she said, "Oh, I have to take you upstairs to 
Beverly because Beverly is going to finish this up and she'll send 
away for your certificate." So I said, "Okay, and I said, "You 
mean to say that I don't have anything to worry about if I buy 
this bond?" 
She said, "No, you don't." She said, "It's backed by 
Lincoln Savings. We're connected with FSLIC, so there's no 
problem." She took me upstairs, and she made out the necessary 
papers. She said, "In a month or six weeks, you'll get your 
bond." She didn't give me any prospectus. In about six weeks, I 
got the bond, and I sort of went through it, and anyway, I was 
getting a monthly interest check, and then I decided I wanted this 
interest to go back into the money market, and I made the change 
and the bank said, "That's okay. You can do that." 
Well, I think it was in April. I had gone to my 
daughter's Hermosa Beach for the weekend, and I came back on 
Monday, and one of the people in Leisure World that I know called 
me up and said, "Have you heard about Lincoln Savings?" 
I said, "What about it?" I said, "I do bank there." 
"Well, they've been taken over by the regulators, and 
American Continental has declared bankruptcy," and I said, "What?" 
and I tell you, I just about fainted and fell off of my chair. I 
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could not believe this. 
Anyway, I immediately took myself down to the I 
I said, "What's going on here?" and the government regulator 
person was there, and she said, "Yes, the government's taken over 
the bank," and I said, "Well, what are we supposed to do?" I 
said, "They told me this was insured." 
She says, "No, no, you weren't insured." 
I said, "That's a fine state of affairs." 
So I went over to one other person there, and I said, 
"Well, what's going on?" 
She said, "Well, Mr. Keating was taking money out of the 
bank for his assets, for building his empire, and that's something 
he shouldn't have done." And she said, "Why don't :you think about 
getting up a petition in Leisure World and fight this?" 
I was so mad and so angry to think that kind of man 
would take advantage of people over seventy years of age, who are 
seniors, including myself, who's a senior, who worked very hard 
for this money to live on for the rest of their lives. 
So I did. I put an announcement in our local paper, 
Laguna Hills News, and I called a meeting. I had over a hundred 
people there, and they signed this petition, and a letter went off 
to the bankruptcy court judge, and on this petition was the name 
of these bond-holders, their address and phone number, the amount 
of the bond, when they bought the bond, when the bond matured, 
their age, and the amount of that bond, and I had about 180 people 
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on that petition, and I would say three quarters of them, if not 
more, were over the age 70, many in their 80's, late 80's, and 
anyway, I've held several meetings. I've watched all the 
newspaper artie I 't understand how the banking commission 
of the State of California could allow such a terrible fraudulent 
thing to go on. 
I've had many calls from people in Leisure World who 
have suffered heart attacks, strokes, their eyes have gone bad, 
they've had nervous breakdowns, as a result of this terrible 
situation, this catastrophic situation. This is absolutely a 
fraud by some kind of a sociopathic man who delights in taking 
from the elderly, and we have about 200 people in Leisure World 
who invested in this and who will tell you, as I have told you, 
that they were not told that these bonds were junk bonds, 
worthless bonds, a worthless piece of paper that meant nothing, 
and they put their life savings in there, hoping to live on this 
amount of money, and I think it's an absolute disgrace, and I 
think •s time something was done about this. 
That's about all I have to say. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you, Ms. Kane. 
There were a couple of points of your testimony I just 
wanted to cover again, briefly to make sure we understood. 
When you entered the Leisure World branch of Lincoln 
Savings, you said you asked to talk to a customer service 
representative; is that correct? 
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MS. KANE: Right. I went in there the 
of getting a CD. I did not go in there to buy a bond. I was not 
one to invest in stocks or bonds. I'm not that sophisticated 
about these things. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And you were referred to a person 
the lobby area? 
MS. KANE: I absolutely was. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And that person introduced herself 
as a customer service representative of Lincoln Savings? 
MS. KANE: Right. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And do you recall the name of that 
person? 
MS. KANE: I cannot. I know that I had the card given 
to me, but I --
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Could you identify that person in a 
line-up? 
MS. KANE: I possibly could, and also, I forgot to 
mention, the manager carne over to me. Her name was Rupert. I 
understand she's no longer there. She also talked to me and she 
said, "Oh, Ms. Kane. I'm very happy to know that you're a new 
customer. Welcome, and I'm glad that you're buying a bond. It's 
a very, very fine company. You have nothing to worry about." She 
was the manager of Lincoln Savings. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So it was a Lincoln employee, so 
identified, who raised the issue of the purchase of the bond? 
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MS. KANE: She certainly was. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And you did not receive a prospectus 
at that time? 
MS. KANE: No. I did not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And then you subsequently went 
upstairs to another level to another person; is that right? 
MS. KANE: I did. In fact, she came down, and I was 
introduced to her. I remember the name distinctly because she 
remained in the bank after the government regulators took over. 
Her name is Beverly. I don't know if she's there anymore or not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: This person, Beverly, was the one 
who ultimately signed you up for the bond; is that right? 
MS. KANE: She did. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did she identify herself as an 
employee of either American Continental or Lincoln? 
MS. KANE: No. She did not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Either way, so you don't know. 
MS. KANE: She didn't tell me anything about that. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: About that? 
M.S • KANE: No . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. And it was the same day that 
you came in on your original visit to Lincoln Savings that you 
purchased the bond? 
MS. KANE: It was, exactly the same day. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And what amount was that? 
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MS. KANE: My bond $15,000. I I I 
me. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. 
MS. KANE: I have original with me. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Were you told that this 
insured, federally insured, this investment? 
MS. KANE: The way that they put it was this: "We are 
backed by FSLIC. Lincoln Savings has five and a quarter lion 
dollars in assets. You have nothing to worry about. This is an 
excellent investment," and she was glowing, and she seemed so 
thrilled that I had bought it. 
I would like to say something, and I don't know 
person's name, but when I held this meeting, one gentleman to 
me, "I want you to know that when I went in to buy my bond, 
employee said, 'Oh, you know, we get a bonus for the amount of 
bonds that we sell.'" Now, I'm sure I can get person's name 
somewhere down the 1 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Powell. 
MR. POWELL: ) names of the people I lt 
with four years ago and so recently. Here's a name now you 
might have heard it. Here's the ones I had. 
The manager is R-A-P-A-N, Rupert. Janet was 
the bond representative last year, '88, and I walked through. 
Robin Wilder was investment counselor, and a young lady named 
Marina, that we got acquainted with, was there, too. Marina. 
- 22 -
Before that, Alice Martinez was the assistant manager. I dealt 
with her. Before that, Beverly Begaro was the bond representative, 
customer service, there at Lincoln. 
So I have the names of all of them I dealt with. That's 
the list that I have. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you very much. We appreciate 
that for the record. 
Ms. Kane, did you ever receive a prospectus? 
MS. KANE: No, I did not. Nothing like that was given 
to me. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So you made the agreement on your 
first visit, and subsequently, you received the document in the 
mail; is that right? 
MS. KANE: Yes, I did, about six weeks afterwards. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I see. Okay. 
MR. POWELL: I think last year they didn't have any 
prospectus. When I took the first one out six years ago, or five 
years ago, they did have a prospectus, not when I bought last 
year. 
MS. KANE: Well, I wanted to say that I purchased my 
bond October 28, 1988, and was to mature December 1, 1989. So 
it was very recently, just a year ago. 





MR· JOSEPH COTCHETT: Chairman me 
absolutely clear that I'm 
I make that c because I some 
23,000 people, and I assume somehow 
up in your memo pad, and that's I'm to 
Something like that. 
I assume you have some questions for me, although 
you ask me some questions, I might add that members of staf 
called members of my staff, my law firm, and asked them 
questions. 
Without violating my as a , and or 
getting into work product, I do want to to some of 
those questions that were asked, which are, 
knowledge, and again, without any I 
I'm willing to answer a few questions you. 
Perhaps, though, the most important that we 
look at here, and I understand from your comments init 
what is the prospect of adopting some lation that 
eliminate the situation of call the Powells and Kanes 
you in the future. 
In a nutshell, looking back on the history, and 's 
best way to look at it, it started in 1981, 1982, when this 
deregulated, if you will, the S&L industry 
Would you 1 me to ? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Epple had a question 
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ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: I do have a question. You 
23,000 people 
MR. COTCHETT: In a class action. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: In a class action suit against 
Lincoln Savings ... ? 
MR. COTCHETT: No. We're not suing Lincoln Savings and 
Loan. We're suing those individuals that put the locomotive on 
the track. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: Okay. I just wanted to be certain 
what capacity 
MR. COTCHETT: When I say I'm representing them, we have 
suits on file that are now pending in federal court, state court, 
and all of those are being consolidated. 
You can't sue Just so that we're clear, you can't sue 
someone in bankruptcy. That's where we're going. 
Very quickly, '81, '82, as you well know, legislation 
was passed which took a lot of regulatory teeth away from the 
state, opened it up, if you will, to a »free marketplace." 
As a result of that "free marketplace," we now have 
Powells and Ms. Kane and some 23,000 other people, most of which 
are from California, and many of whom I interviewed speak not the 
best English. 
I think that's important to know. When I say that I 
mean these are individuals who, if you showed this prospectus to, 
I note that the last page here is 47, I doubt sincerely that the 
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cross-section of America a CD 47 
before they put their li 1 $10,000 1 
be, up. 
So when I to, a 
chap by the name of Martinez, 
little families you ever met, 
and said, "Mr. Cotchett, I have a CD," I said, "No, Mr. Mart 
You know what you have? You have a bond, a 
worthless." He didn't , to 
So when we talk 
these very nice documents, 's s. 
Very quickly, and I want to c 
that on behalf of 23,000 we f 
the state, I would suggest to 
very well, with all due 
from the Department of and Loan 
Commissioner. I note he's f I want to 
nice about him in a moment. It wou well to 's 
hands on those are awesome 
those documents is laid out most ever 
seen. 
I suggest you look at a of f I 
have right in front of me, which tell 
before Mrs. Kane bought her debenture, the state Lincoln 
Savings and Loan and ACC -- me 1 was $1 
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1 Not a million dollars, not $10 million, but $1 bil 
You will find that in a file numbered 2045211. You wi 
find that the Commissioner of Savings and Loans and his chief 
financial advisor brought that to the attention of the Department 
of Corporations. 
Sitting in this room right now is Franklin Tom, the 
former Commissioner of Corporations, with his not one but two 
attorneys, perhaps three. I might add that a good number of 
defense attorneys are out there waiting to hear what I might tell 
you today. I hope they listen because Franklin Tom served as the 
Commissioner of Corporations from 1984, at least what my records 
show, public records, to some time in March of '87, and I have 
here a document dated March 22, 1988, which, if the typewriter 
struck true and if there was no mistake in this document written 
by Wallace M. Wong, he says to Wayne Simon, as I said, dated March 
' 22, 1988, that the reviewing counsel, Ronald Carruth, prepared a 
referral memorandum which indicated that the had spoken to the 
applicant's counsel, Franklin Tom, and told him, "If earnings 
continue to decline and the quality of earnings deteriorate, we 
may impose suitability for future take-downs." The date of that, 
March 23, 1987. 
So if my dates are correct -- Now, the memo is dated 
'88, listening to someone behind me. The recollection is --You 
see, what you're going to find is fascinating. You're going to 
find that they write memos back and forth to each other recounting 
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happened a re to 
something. So to me 
records themselves s i 
I'm correct, just a few now 
representing ACC an to $20 
million worth of bonds. 
• Now, at or 1988, f 
out -- it's call the II l" factor -- that was as 
at the store, and to 
without a proper a 
it's fascinating 
Mr. Crawford came met 
said, "We have a 
thinking --" and I 
"thinking they're !f if I memos 
correctly, Mr. of 
but in fact what 
rationalized 
When I l .. I! I 
awesome. 
I would now to to a 13, 98 memo 
and before I do go I 1 18 1988, 
a memo was written to fi I 
believe that memo is right room was 
a meeting held on May 18, 1988. I as I some 
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eight days prior to issuance of the second offering, I can 
call them that. was a meeting held with a whole series of 
top level D.O.C. people and Department of Savings and Loan people. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Morris being one of the 
Department of Corporation management people; is that right? 
MR. COTCHETT: No. Mr. Morris wrote a memo to the file 
-- and I'm not saying where he is right now, and I'll come back to 
that in a moment-- in which he concludes, and I'm led to believe 
this is the language, "The whole affair looks like a Ponzi 
Scheme," and that was known eight days before the then-Department 
of Corporations approved the sale of an additional $200 million 
worth of bonds. 
I call your attention to a memo written ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Morris -- You were going to 1 
us who he was. 
MR. COTCHETT: Mr. Morris is a state employee, and I'm 
not sure where was shifting back and forth. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I understand, but he was with the 
Department of Corporations? 
MR. COTCHETT: Or the Department of Savings and Loan. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And he was present for the meeting 
that you refer to? 
MR. COTCHETT: I can't answer that he was present. I 
can only let the memo speak for itself. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So he prepared the memo 1 and it went 
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the f 
MR. .. . t's correc 
? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: 
MR. COTCHETT: On 13, 1989, - Now, just a 
of months ago, a who 
Mr. Baker, Mr. Riff, Mr. 
their memory of the sent to Wayne 
Simon, Chief Deputy It's 13, 1989. I 
don't have to now. It's an 
document. It 
Well, me just Ten, 's 
some of the downs 
of Mar 
of the Department f 
Bob Rifkin, etc., etc. f 's 
factors into 
One, he was worr to s 
by ACC. There to two 
hotels. By , one of 
the employees go to. He 
work something out Home Loan 
presidential was a cons went into 
the determination of 1 of these 
up by saying that there was a 
u.s. Attorney's Off I not 
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a use Home Loan 
a l too the report back in 1986, and they 
had that report, and had they looked at that report, neither one 
of these individuals would sitting here today. It is all laid 
out documents. are all state documents that show how, 
through some very interesting maneuvering, these bonds were 
fostered upon individuals like this. 
There were many people, it appears from these memos, 
that were greatly concerned about that. And one, Chairman 
Johnston, you talk about legislation. I guess what we're going to 
have to do is put into effect some legislation that figures out 
how we deal with that final decision-making process, because 
that's what these memos point out. They point out an operation 
that was $1 billion in debt, that was, in fact, a Ponzi scheme and 
somehow got approved. 
Lastly, I just want to comment on -- I have never met 
Mr. Powell before. I heard him describe the prospectus. What a 
lot of people get confused with, Mr. Johnston, is that there were 
two documents they were handing out. One was a glossy brochure, 
and one was a prospectus. They always got the glossy brochure 
because that showed how they were going to Arizona the next 
state of New York and how they were going to make the hotel 
Phoenix into the Waldorf Astoria and how they were going to spread 
the gospel to world of American ACC. So what they would hand 
them, of a legal prospectus, in most cases, was a 
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brochure, and sometimes they would get a prospectus later in the 
mail. Sometimes. 
Other than that, unless you have some very specific 
questions ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We appreciate your testimony, 
particularly in your current capacity representing a number of 
individuals and involved in a class-action suit. 
The issue of the prospectus -- Mr. Powell testified that 
he did receive a prospectus but evidently, even after reading ..... l.l., 
was not clear in his own mind that these were not insured 
deposits. Ms. Kane said she did at no time receive a prospectus. 
In your review and interviewing of those bondholders who are 
currently out there with, perhaps, worthless paper, have you 
reached any generalization in your own mind as to who received or 
how many or where there were differences between offices? 
MR. COTCHETT: I think it's clear that at the outset 
they perhaps did receive prospectuses. As the time went on and it 
got frenzied -- by frenzied, I mean they were going in the poop so 
fast that, in the words of a great American, they were in "deep 
doo-doo." They had to push this, to use your phrase, "worthless 
paper," so fast that the prospectus lost meaning, if you will. 
The concept was to get Ms. Kane and get her check, not worrying 
about giving her her prospectus, and you saw the trend move in 
that direction. 
So it may have been at the outset ... 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So you're suggesting Mr. 
Powell, who came in early on, when the first issuance was made, 
perhaps received it, and Ms. Kane, who clearly purchased hers 
after the second issuance, was not provided that prospectus, is 
that right? 
MR. COTCHETT: To give you an example how frenzied 
got don't hold me to these dates -- but between October 1988 
and the second or third month of 1989, when Ms. Kane bought, they 
sold over $100 million worth of worthless paper. The way Ms. Kane 
describes it, $100 million; they were not concerned about 
prospectus. They were concerned about getting them to the account 
clerk upstairs, sign them up, get the check, and maybe get a fancy 
brochure in their hands. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Is it your impression that there 
were differences from office to office, or that there was some 
company-wide policy? 
MR. COTCHETT: We're told they had standard sales 
pitches. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Powell. If you'd speak into the 
microphone, it'll help us. 
MR. POWELL: I received both the prospectus. Of course, 
the first we got was a beautiful brochure about things, color, all 
that, which attracts suckers or attract~ pigeons. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you know if this brochure, 
whatever it was -- I have not seen a copy of it and perhaps there 
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were different ones at different times -- does it make clear that 
these bonds are not federally insured? Do you know? 
MR. POWELL: Well, the brochure has nothing to do with 
the bonds now. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: It does not? 
MR. COTCHETT: No. The brochure, you see, tells you 
about ACC and what a wonderful company it is. The purpose of 
handing the individual the brochure was to give them the so-called 
security blanket that when they looked at it, it was big, it was 
beautiful, an it had big buildings in it. How could they possibly 
lose their little $10,000? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The little story about the 
Phoenician Hotel given to Ms. Kane? 
MR. COTCHETT: Exactly. 
By the way, I think this is instructive. We have found 
out about a hand-written note that I think is very interesting. 
It's a profile of American Continental Corporation that describes 
it as being politically powerful, lobbies to the right, hires 
regulators, divides them, threatens them, and then conquers them. 
MS. KANE: May I say something? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yes, Ms. Kane. 
MS. KANE: After looking over this petition that I have, 
I have noticed that an awful lot of these people in Leisure World 
renewed their bonds in the year 1988 and carried them over 
anywhere from two to five years, and I would say that on my 
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petition alone, totals up to about three to l 
dollars, and if I had twenty more names on the petition, it would 
probably be five or six million dollars, and that's a lot of money 
for senior citizens who are retired and depend on this money to 
live on. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We appreciate much 
testimony, Mr. Cotchett, Mr. Powell, and Ms. Kane. Thank you very 
much. 
I'd like to now invite Mr. Franklin Tom to come to the 
witness table. 
Mr. Miller, would you swear in the witness? 
MR. MILLER: Mr. Tom, were you present or did you read 
the statement regarding your rights as a witness before the 
Committee? 
MR. TOM: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Then you understand that statement? 
MR. TOM: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Do you agree to testify voluntarily under 
the conditions stated in that section of the Government Code? 
MR· BOB DRAPER: Your Honor, my name is Bob Draper. I'm 
with O'Melveny and Myers in Los Angeles. I'm one of the-- not 
one but two attorneys that Mr. Cotchett referred to, and I came 
here not to represent Mr. Cotchett but to represent Mr. Tom. 
Mr. Tom took the same attorneys' oath that Mr. Cotchett 
referred to, and pursuant to that oath, 's very difficult for 
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him to testify here as to events that took place after he left the 
Corporations Department, and so I would respectfully request that 
questions of the Committee be limited to the time that Mr. Torn was 
Commissioner of Corporations. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, I'm not sure we can do that, 
sir. If Mr. Torn decides to invoke some privilege, he is certainly 
free to do that, and we would not compel his testimony, but we 
will certainly begin with the period that he was Commissioner, but 
it may be that the Committee will want to ask you some questions 
relative to the period of time since you left the employ of the 
State of California. 
MR. DRAPER: I think, Mr. Chairman, that we'll have to 
take those questions one at a time. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I would imagine we would. 
Mr. Tom. 
MR. MILLER: Well, we were interrupted before we 
finished, so do you wish to testify before the Committee subject 
to your right to the privileges? 
MR. TOM: Yes, subject to the privileges that I believe, 
or my counsel believes, I must invoke. 
MR. MILLER: All right. Would you ra.ise your right 
hand, please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are 
about to give to this Committee will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth? 
MR. TOM: Yes. 
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MR. MILLER: Would you state your name for the record, 
please. 
MR. E'RANKLIN 'l'OM: My name is Franklin Tom, T-0-M. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Tom, would you tell the 
Committee when you were Commissioner of Corporations for the state 
of Cali fonli.a. 
MR. 'l'OM; Yes. l was appointild effective March 1, 
excuse me, March 15, 1983, and I left office on February 28, 1987. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And current 1 what is your 
employment? 
MR. TOM: I'm a partner of a law firm called Parker, 
Milliken 1 Clark, O'Hara, and Samuelian. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: At the time t~hat you were 
Commissioner, what procedures would have been followed in the 
approval of the offering by American Continental that we've spoken 
about today, the subordlnated debenture? 
MR. TOM: Well, I can answer the question the following 
way because I have had no knowledge concerning the filing, 
handling or qualification of the application that was filed on 
behalf of American Continental in 1986 when I was Commissioner of 
Corporations under which the first issuance of subordinated 
debentures was permitted in California. That was handled within 
my office, but I had no personal knowledge regarding any of that. 
I can tell you what general ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: As Commissioner of Corporations, are 
37 -
you not responsible for the employees, their actions and the 
procedures followed in the approval of debentures? 
MR. TOM: All of the employees at the Department are 
given grants of authority upon the assumption of office of a 
Commissioner, and they set forth the scope of responsibility and 
authority of that person. 
In connection with the people who would have handled the 
qualification of these debentures, they would have had the 
authority to accept, review, and process and approve, or qualify, 
I should say, the filings of offerings of securities that were 
before them and would have had the authority to sign the requisite 
papers to show that qualification under my name or the 
then-appropriate person, the then-Commissioner's name. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The point is it's under your name, 
is it not? 
MR. TOM: It was indeed. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So the buck stops with you as 
Commissioner, does it not? 
MR. TOM: Yes, it did. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So ultimately, for that period that 
you were Commissioner, you are responsible for the actions taken 
by your Department, are you not? 
MR. TOM: Subject to ttw understanding that €!VfH'Y year 
there are literally thousands of applications which are filed at 
the Department of Corporations and are handled by an array of 
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professionals, including some fi and over a hundred 
accountants in the Department. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, why don't we continue and if 
you would tell the Committee what procedures were relevant to this 
approval process and then you can comment to the degree that 
you're familiar with any given review. You said that you were not 
familiar at that time with ACC's applic~tion? 
.MR. 'l'OM: That's right. The process by which such 
applications would have been processed at the Department is as 
follows: There are several offices of the Department of 
Corporations. The particular office, as it happens, the 
American Continental file had been processed for a number of 
years, I gather ·-- I don't know as of what date 1 but I believe it 
was for several years -- was in the San Francisco office. The 
application, once it was received in the San Francisco office, 
just as other offices there, would have then been assigned by the 
person who is in charge of that office's Securities Regulation 
Division, which is the division that reviews tl~se applications, 
assigned to a particular lawyer within the division. That lawyer 
would then have the responsibility to review the application, 
submit such comments as he thought was appropriate and ultimately 
dispose of the file in the manner that he thought was correct and 
invoke whatever ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How many employees worked for the 
Department of Corporations? 
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MR. TOM: It was approximately 350, I believe. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: And how many would have been 
assigned to this particular division of the Department? 
MR. TOM: My guess would be perhaps a hundred. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And there's a supervisor, deputy 
director, in charge of that division? 
MR. TOM: There was a statewide Assistant Commissioner 
who is in charge of the Securities Regulation Division, and then, 
in each of the two principal offices, San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, there is a supervising lawyer. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: This file was in San Francisco; is 
that correct? 
MR. TOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Who was the supervising person 
there? 
MR. TOM: In San Francisco, Michael Brody. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And who was his superior? Was that 
the Deputy Commissioner? 
MR. TOM: That would have been the Assistant 
Commissioner with statewide authority over that division that I 
mentioned. His name is Jerry Baker. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And Mr. Baker, then, reported to you 
as Commissioner? 
MR. TOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ,JOHNSTON: Did you in the normal course of 
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carrying out your responsibilities have meet with the Deputy 
Commissioner or with those other managers and review s ficant 
applications in the securities area? 
MR. TOM: The process by which that would occur, I 
guess, is in two parts. First, if there were a s ficant policy 
issue, which could either be brought up because of a particular 
filing that was made or because it was ·ust that 
occurred to a member of the staff. That would be handled by an 
analysis usual at the staff then it wou percolate up 
to perhaps my office. Insofar as ar fi were concerned, 
those matters were handled at the staff counsel leve it was 
the responsibility of the staff counsel to in conjunction 
with or alert his supervisor that file required 
more supervisory attention. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did this file require more 
attention? 
MR. •roM: As I said before, I am not familiar with how 
the J.Jarticular American ConL nE:nta] file in 1986 was handled. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: It was never t:o 
attention? 
MR. TOM: It was not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What are the criteria the 
Department in making a decision to i debentures for sale? 
MR. TOM: The statutory criterion for an offering of 
this kind, which is qualified under a coordination procedure. 
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That is a procedure which tends to coordinate federal SEC 
clearance with state clearance, is that the state qualification 
will become effective automatically within a certain number of 
days unless the Department finds that the offering is unfair, 
unjust, or inequitable, in which case it has the authority to stop 
the offering. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: At what point did you become aware 
of the offering by American Continental through Lincoln Suvings? 
MR. TOM: Thn 1986 offering? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yes. 
MR. TOM: That. would have been in 1987 upon my return to 
my law firm. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Until that point 1 you had no 
knowledge? 
MR. TOM: That's correcL. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: No one contacted you either within 
the Department or outside of the Department? 
MR. TOM: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Relative to the offering made by 
American Continental? 
MR. TOM: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What was your previous employment 
prior to assuming your duties as Commissioner of Corporations? 
MR. TOM: I was a partner of Parker, Milliken, the same 
law firm I'm with today. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was that ldw finn counsel for 
American Continental or Mr. Charles Keating? 
MR. DRAPER: At what time, Mr. Chairman? 
Cl~IRMAN JOHNSTON: The time to Mr. Tom's 
employment. 
MR. TOM: Prior to the time that I was Commissioner of 
Corporations, it was not a client of ou:· firm, neither Lincoln 
Savings nor American Continental, nor any of their affiliates nor 
any of Uwir p incipal.~ that. I'm aware of. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'fON: How about Lincoln Savings? 
MR. TOM: It was not a client of our officE-; e ther. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'I'ON: When did you first meet Mr. Keating? 
MR. TOM: It would have been some time in 1987, upon my 
return to the firm. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: After your return to the firm? 
MR. TOM: Somet.ime after my return to the firm, yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: In 1987, then, you left the state. 
Up until that time had anyone made you aware of any problems 
concerned with the offering of these debentures? 
MR. TOM: No. I wasn't even familiar with the fact that 
the offering had been filed or approved. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When you left the state's employ, 
when did you fir-~ t b(:come involved w .i th Am<~rLcan Continenta 1? 
MR. TOM: It was shortly after I -- Let me start back a 
moment. In 1986, when the first filing was made at the Department 
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of Corporations concerning these subordinated debentures, my old 
law firm was the counsel that made that filing on behalf of 
American Continental. Needless to say I \vas not involved or knew 
anything about that offering. 
So that upon my return to the firm in March of 1987, it 
was a pre-existing client of the firm. lt was not a client of the 
firm prior to my becoming Commissioner, but it was a pre-existing 
client of the firm at the time that I returned to the firm. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Were the employees of the Department 
aware that the firm representing this applicant was the firm from 
which you came? 
MR. TOM: They may or they may not have. I frankly do 
not know. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'fON: Well, who would have represented the 
MR. TOM: During the time I was Commjssioner? Other 
lawyers in my firm. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Might that include any of the 
partners? 
MR. TOM: It might have, yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Samuelian? 
MR. TOM: Perhaps 1 although I have no knowledge of the 
fact that he had anything to do with that filing. If you take a 
look at the file of the Department, which r have done to some 
extent, although not on a thorough bas.is, UH! lawyer ill our offlcf~ 
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who handled those filings and with whom I believe all 
correspondence and other contact between the Department and our 
firm prior to my return t.o the firm -- in fact, substantially 
subsequent to my return to the firm with one exception, was Joseph 
Martinez, who is an associate lawyer in our office. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Why would the Department of 
Corporations, Mr. Ronald Carruth, on March 24, 1987, or less than 
a month after you left as Commissioner, write you a letter which 
says, "Dear Mr. Tom: At your request we have shipped our files on 
this corporation ... "-- that was American Continental Corporation 
-- " ... to our Los Angeles office for permanent retention." 
The second paragraph says, "If earnings continue to 
decline, we may be unable to grant an open qualification in the 
future for the applicant's debt. Accordingly, future takedowns 
may need to be qualified on a suitability basis." 
Why was that letter written to you? 
MR. •roM: I'd be glad to explain it because I think it 
was misrepresented by one of the prior witnesses. Upon my return 
to Parker, Milliken, :c_;hortly after Lhat, Me. Martinez of my firm 
came in to discuss a difficulty with respect to the filings for 
American Cont.inental before the Department. The difficulty arose 
from the following: American Continental was represented for 
securities purposes by another law firm in New York. That law 
firm prepared the prospectus, the registration statement, all of 
the other filings which were used for federal purposes and would 
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then be responsible for shipping those copies excuse me -- of 
those filings to our office for handling for the California filing 
because it was, as a general rule, the requirement of a more or 
less simultaneous California filing to correspond to the federal 
filing. The problem that Mr. Martinez came to see me about was 
that from time to time there would be an inadvertent delay in the 
transmittal of those copies to our office, such that we would be 
unable to, as promptly as we would have wished to, file those 
documents at the Department of Corporations. 
We first had to get the copies from New York. We then 
had to prepare the necessary California materials which required 
the signature of an officer of American Continental. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So within days, or within hours, 
after your return to the law firm? 
MR. TOM: No. 'I'wo weeks, say, approximately, the time 
of Mr. Carruth's letter. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Which was less than four weeks? 
MR . •roM : R i g h t . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So he was very expeditious in 
accommodating your request to move the files? 
MR. TOM: No, no. Excuse me. Let me step back a bit 
because I wasn't clear in my statement, apparently. 
Mr. Martinez came to see me, a lawyer in my office, came 
to see me about this problem of the timelJness of filing papers at 
the Department of Corporations on behaJ f o t American Con Li nent:al. 
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'l'his occurred approxiruatr~ly on the date or just before the date of 
Mr. CarruLh's lelter, the 26th, or whatever that day was, in 
March, and he said, "This is a problem. We cannot file timely. 
We've got to get the documents from New York. We have to get a 
signature from Phoenix, and then we have to file in San 
Francisco. " 
Well, I didn't know how to haudle the problem of getting 
the documents from New York and I couldn't speed up the execution 
of the documents in Phoenix, but I did have a solution to his 
problem about having to then have an overnight transmittal, which 
is fairly expensive, to San Francisco and, accounting for the 
delay ot drH>ther ddy, havl: the file shipped to Los Angeles. It's 
an absolutely common occurrence for files Lo be moved either on 
the Department's own motion or upon request of the issuer's 
counsel to another location that is convenient for all parties, 
and since the file was in San Francisco for largely historical 
purposes that didn't seem to have any particular relevance today, 
and I don't even know what those purposes were originally, I said, 
"Let's get the file moved." So I called Mr. Carruth in Mr. 
Martinez's presence and asked him if he would consent to the file 
being moved. He thus had the file moved and sent me the letter 
which you just read. 
Now, he gratuitously included the statement regarding 
his concern about the deteriorating financial condition of 
American Continental. 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Was that in response to some 
conversation that you had with him on the phone? 
MR. TOM: Absolutely not at all. He simply raised it 
himself. f'm not saying he was wrong in raising it. He raised it 
himself. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'I'ON: Did he raise it on the phone? 
MR. TOM: He may have raised it on the phone; I frankly 
cannot recall. But in any event, what I'd like to emphasi?.e is 
that the purpose of my call to him had nothing to do with that 
application that he was working on and that Mr. Martinez was 
working on. The purpose of my call to him, and as far as I was 
concerned, the purpose of his communication with me, was the 
transfer of the file which is a purely ministerial contact. That, 
Mr. Johnston, was my sole dealing with the Department of 
Corporations during the more than period following my 
return to the firm. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'I'ON: I understand your testimony, I 
believe, and the significance of it that you place on it. You 
were Corporations Commissioner for a period of time. During that 
period of time, this company was anxious to get approval for a 
junk bond offering made rather unusually through its own principal 
company or asset, which was Lincoln Savings. It then decided out 
of all the fine law firms in California to choose Lh(') i inn that 
you had previously been associated with, and in fact, t~he Deputy 
Commissioner had been associated with. That firm, through Mr. 
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Martinez and perhaps Mr. Samuelian, its partner, one of its 
principals, and parenthetically a major fundraiser for the 
Governor, who appointed you, proceeded to receive approval from 
lower level employees without your involvement. That's your 
testimony. Less than four weeks after your departure from the 
Department 1 you called t_he Senior Corporations Counsel and asked 
him to provide some help, namely a simr' y ministerial change of a 
file from one office that supervised and oversaw and apparently 
approved the bonds t.hat were issued by American Continental to 
another office for the convenience 1 1 of your law firm 
and/or Lincoln Savings, American Continental, for some reason, 
gratuitously, as you put it. 
In the Counsel's letter to you confirming the change 
that you had requested, he decides to talk about, essentially, the 
condition of Lincoln Savings and American Continental and their 
bonds. 
Is it unreasonable to at least ask the question whether 
the point of your call, in addition to that ministerial change, 
was to notify your former colleagues, in fact, your former 
subordinat.es, that you now were involved with Lincoln and American 
Continental? 
MR. TOM: If that had been my reason, I should not have 
had the file transferred since I obviously notified one person and 
then had the file transferred or assigned to another person. 
MR. DRAPER: Mr. Chainnan, I'm sorry. I tried to get in 
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before Mr. Tom's answer. Mr. Tom is a defendant in the lawsuit 
that Mr. Cotchett referred to, and it is possible this testimony 
might be used in that lawsuit, and so for purposes of the record, 
I need to object to your question, respectfully, on the ground 
that I don't know what part of it was a question and what part of 
it was a statement, and I think in terms of Mr. Torn's testimony, 
it's difficult to know what it is he's supposed to respond to. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Torn, after March of 1987, to 
what extent were you involved with Lincoln or American 
Continental? Did you represent them? Did you do legal work for 
them? 
MR. TOM: Upon my return to Parker Milliken? Yes, I 
did. 
Excuse me. May I have a moment to consult with my 
counsel? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Sure. 
MR. TOM: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: At what point did you contact the 
Department of Corporations on behalf of American Continental or 
Lincoln Savings? 
MR. TOM: Besides the communication with Mr. Carruth? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Right. After March of 1987. 
MR. TOM: It would have been in late 1988. I'm sorry, I 
need to correct myself. It was in March of 1988. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You're familiar, I'm sure, wjth the 
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Department of Corporations regulations relative to what sometimes 
is referred to as a revolving door, or representation of cLient.s 
after leaving an official government capacity, specifically, "No 
person shall appear in a representative capacity before the 
Department in a matter if such person, or anyone assisting him or 
participating with him in such representation, personally 
considered the matter or gained knowled~e of the facts thereof 
during any former employment or association with the Department. 
Nothing in the preceding sentence shall prohibit appearance in a 
proceeding more than two years after a 
official ... " and so forth. 
ceases to be an 
So it's your testimony, it was your testimony from the 
outset that you had no personal knowledge of the approval of the 
bond offering by your Department? 
MR. TOM: That's right. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And therefore, this particular 
provision, in you judgment, is not. relevant -- well, the provision 
is relevant, but you certainly, in your judgment ... 
MR. TOM: It does not apply. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: It does not apply to you; is that 
correct? 
All right. The section goes on to read, "No person who 
has been a Commissioner, a Chief Deputy Commissioner, or an 
Assistant Commissioner shall within one year after his employment 
has ceased, appear in a representative capacity before the 
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Department with respect to any application or proceeding that was 
pending under his official responsibility (whether or not it was 
brought to his personal attention) at any time while he was 
employed by the Department." 
Do you believe that applies? 
MR. TOM: Well, I'm not sure what you mean by "it 
applies." It was not violated by me. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Would you give your reasons to the 
Committee as to why you believe you did not violate it? 
MR. TOM: Because the only contact which I had with the 
Department of Corporations during the one year period that is 
referred to in that sentence which you've read from the Conflict 
of Interest Rule was to have requested Mr. Carruth to have the 
file sent to Los Angeles. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Additionally, you would, I suppose, 
suggest that when you did next contact the Department, it was in 
March of 1988 or virtually exactly twelve months after you left 
the Department. 
• MR. TOM: The point is it was not within the one-year period. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The point is, based on what we know 
and your testimony, which I'm not disputing, you complied with the 
letter of the law; is that right? 
MR. TOM: That is my understanding of my obligation. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'rQN: Right. And then, once that one-year 
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period had run, you immediately represented client, ACC, 
before the Department in its dealings with its second offering, 
and with a renewal for a period of time of the remainder of its 
first offering; is that correct? 
MR. TOM: Not exactly. First of all, I think it's clear 
from my testimony that I did not deal with the Department, 
represent that client before the DepartH;ent during the one-year 
period that is prohibited by the Conflict of Interest Rule. I 
subsequently represented American Continental before the 
Department in connection with its year filings. Those 
were different applications as well as being after the one-year 
period, so on both those grounds, it seems to me that the 
transactions are not covered, those representations are not 
covered by the Conflict of Interest Rule. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The first bond offering approved by 
your Department, the 1986 offering? 
MR. TOM: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When did American Continental 
conclude the sale of those bonds? 
MR. TOM: I don't know. I mean, I assume .... Let me be 
sure I understand your question. I presume your question is, 
"When did they finish selling off that issuance?" and the answer 
is, "I don • t know. " 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS~UN: Wasn't there an extension that was 
necessary in order for the bonds to continue to be marketed beyond 
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the date that was originally approved for their sale? 
MR. TOM: 'l'here were two applications filed. One was an 
application which was filed in March of 1988, which the Department 
qualified for a limited sixty-day period. That was for the 
purpose of permitting the bonds to be able to be sold during that 
sixty-day period during which we would file and did indeed file a 
second application for additional subordinate debt. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So, in 1986, $200 million wcs 
authorized at the request of ACC by the Department to be sold 
through Lincoln Savings Institution. When, in March of 1987, you 
represented -- excuse me -- March, 1988, twelve months and a few 
days after you left the Department, American Continental was 
asking two things: 1) a 60-day window, or to be granted a 60-day 
window -- I don't know what you asked, but they were granted a 
60-day window to sell the remainder of those $200 million bonds, 
and then an application to authorize the sale of an additional 
$150 million; is that correct? 
MR. 'l'OM: I think the number is slightly off on the 
second. It wasn't $150 million but I would be hard pressed to 
give the exact number. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. What occurred, in your 
judgment, with the decision in March of 1988 to approve those 
bonds? Can you to that jssue? 
MR. •roM: Yon mean what factors wt.'n.• cons i dnn:d in 
connection with the ... 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNS~~N: Yes. You were on Lhe other side, 
now, but you were very familiar with it. 
MR. TOM: Wel 1, T can telJ you what-- T mean, 
obv.iuusly, l <.Jidn'L pdt'IJcipdU:! in Lhc; procf~odings at the 
Department itself. I know what happened there only by virtue of 
the files of the Department of Corporations, which have been made 
publicly available, and I obviously dealt with, you know, various 
lawyers at the Department with regard to that qualification. 
The Department was quite thorough in its comments on 
that application. cl'he process by which the communication goes 
back and forth is that after any filing takes place, there is a 
review, by whoever the appropriate people at the Depa.rtment are, 
followed by comments back to the applicant or the lawyers. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, Mr. Tom, I assume you're a 
public-spirited individual. That's why you left a fine law firm 
to serve a stint as Corporations Commissioner, probably at a 
reduction in income to do that. You said 1 and we have no reason 
to doubt, that you were not aware while you were Corporations 
Commissioner of the offering or familiar with American Continental 
or Lincoln Savings. Then you leave, and one of your 
responsibilities, which I assume you freely elected to assume by 
the law firm, was to represent this corporation; is t right? 
MR. TOM: Well, I assumed a part of the representation 
of American Continental. I emphasize that American Continental 
and Lincoln Savings were clients of my law firm commencing 
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sometime jn 1985. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: I appreciate that. WtH_:re I'm 
heading is here: After your experience as Corporations 
Commissioner, once you became familiar with the way these bonds 
were being marketed and familiar with the operation of ACC, did 
you find it unusual or an odd practice for, or a healthy practice 
for a company to sell through its subsidiary, which has insured 
deposits, right in its lobby, these junk bonds? 
MR. DRAPER: I'm sorry. r have to object to ~hat 
characterization as ''junk bonds." I don't think that's a proper 
characterization. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Subordinated debentures, bank 
accounts, or-- if I went to law school I'd probably get it right. 
MR. TOM: •rhere have -- I think what you· re alluding to, 
if I'm not mistaken ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, I'm asking you-- You're a 
human being. You're a citizen. You were a lawyer before. You're 
a lawyer after. You were a Corporations Commissioner. I've sat 
in Committee hearings where you've testified. You do an able job. 
I assume you are proud of the service you rendered to the people 
of California. Now you move out of that, and you represent a 
client and you have your responsibilities in that regard, but 
we're here, in a legislative setting, wondering what happened. 
Now, obviously, the taxpayers of the United States are 
picking up the freight for the failure of ACC, your client. Now, 
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they had sufficient funds to hire good , and you were one 
of them, but I'm asking you, once you became familiar with ACC and 
how it opE:!ratud, did you find it unusual or did t~his kind of 
thing, in your judgment, go on all the time with savings and loans 
and their parents? 
MR. TOM: I do not find it unusual in this respect: 
First of all, one has to recognize what the facts were, as known 
by ourselves and everyone else, at the time that the 
representation took place, and second, to recognize the fact that 
the duty of a lawyer is to his client, not to only 
represent those who are non-controversial. I'm sure you would not 
take the position that a controversial client is not entitled to 
representation of counsel. 
So I didn't view it my duty to screen my clients from 
the standpoint of whether or not they would deserve a "Good 
Housekeeping seal of approval." Even assuming that the 
allegations made against Lincoln or American Continental or 
Charles Keating, or anyone else, are correct, which are still 
matters of issue, as I'm sure you know. They are still matters of 
legal dispute. Sure l knew that the cLient was not a "plain 
vanilla" savings and loan. It was clear from the prospectus. It 
was clear from he first several pages, not to mention Page 44 of 
the prospectus. It was clear from the cover of the prospectus 
that the company itself was involved in particular investments 
that required specific disclosure in the us. It was also 
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clear from the prospectus -- in bold face, I might add -- that 
these were not FSLIC-insured papers. It was also clear that the 
Department of Savings and Loan had approved a system whereby a 
very specific space within the savings and loan branches were 
allocated for the purpose of allowing a salesperson, an employee 
of American Continental Corporation, to sit and act as a 
salesperson for the American continental Bonds, and those are the 
circumstances under which we were engaged, and we satisfied our 
engagement. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: During the 1987 to early '88 period, 
in your capacity as an attorney, did you become aware of 
complaints or concerns by bond-holders or other regulators, 
perhaps such as the Department of Savings and Loan as to perhaps 
violations of that understanding, that there would be somehow a 
cut-out in the middle of an S&L by which people would 
somehow be able to distinguish that this was a different sales 
operation than the normal business transacted by Lincoln Savings? 
MR. TOM: I'm not sure I fully understand that question. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, you correctly point out that: 
1) the prospectus does say that these are not insured bonds; 2) 
the prospectus, if you get through the entirety of it, makes clear 
that Lincoln Savings has been involved in some very high-risk 
investment activities; and 3) it says, although it doesn't quite 
highlight it, that there have been problems, significant problems, 
with its regulator, namely tho Federal Home r~ar1 Bank Board, and 
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that some agreement had been reached to raise c ital with respect 
l.o thdl <~apitdl !ihuL~tf<Jil. 
MIL 'l'OM: Yes . 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: l of that being the case, were you 
also aware prior to the time that you represented this company and 
asked the Department that you once headed to approve an issuance 
of even more bonds that there had been complaints or that this 
practice was perhaps not one that protected the public? 
MR. TOM: I wasn't aware of any complaints. None were 
prof ffo:red to me. I wasn't aware of any compJaints any 
bond-holders about any inappropriate pract.ices that were 
inconsistent with the statements made in thE-} prospectus. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Or by the Department of Savings and 
Loan, which apparently did have considerable concern at an early 
point? 
MR. TOM: I don't know that it was an early point. In 
May of 1988, the Department of Savings and Loan sent a notice of 
which I was aware, although it was not addressed to me, giving 
notice of the fact that in their opinion, their prior approval of 
the sublease which allowed American Continental to have premises 
within the Lincoln Branches did not extend to the additional 
debentures that were be that had by that time been ified 
or were then being qualified. I'm not sure. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'I'ON: I suppose that. the bond-holders 
would not have complained until Lincoln Savings went bel up and 
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suddenly their bonds were worthless. 
MR. DRAPER: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. To the extent 
that's a question, I think it calls for speculation. I'll object 
to it on that grounds. I might make it clear about my making 
objections. I'm doing it for purposes of pending lawsuits. I 
don't mean to be intervening. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you still represent ACC? 
MR. TOM: No. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you represent Mr. Keating? 
MR. TOM: No, nor Lincoln Savings. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Nor Lincoln Savings. 
Do you know where Mr. Keating is? We had trouble 
reaching him. 
MR. TOM: No, I do not. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: How many times have you met with Mr. 
Keating? 
MR. TOM: Maybe half-a-dozen times at the most. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: When would have been the last 
occasion? 
MR. TOM: I really can't recall, but it was many months 
ago. It was prior to the filing of the Chapter Eleven proceedings 
by ACC. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And your firm, of which you are a 
partner, is no longer involved in the representation of any of 
these persons or entities? 
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MR. TOM: Or any of those 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank much, Mr. Tom. 
MR. 'OOM: You're welcome. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS~~N: I'd like to ask the Savings and Loan 
Commissioner, Bill Crawford, and Mr. Bill Davis, to come to the 
witness table, and ask Mr. Miller if he would swear them in. 
MR. M.ILLER: I believe both Oi. you gentlemen were 
present in the room when I read the statement regarding your 
rights before the Committee 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Do you agree to testify voluntari and 
understand the conditions stated in that statement? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise your right hand, then, 
please. 
MR. CRAWFORD: We also have Ms. Shirley Thayer of the 
Department, if she's going to participate. You're not? Okay. 
Here for moral support. All 
MR. MILLER: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony 
you're about to give the Committee will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but 
MR. CRAWFORD AND MR. DAVIS: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Thank you. 
Would each of you state your name for the record, 
please 1 and your official position? 
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MR. CRAWFORD: William J. Crawford, Savings and Loan 
Commissioner, State of California. 
MR. DAVIS: William D. Davis, Chief Deputy Commissioner. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Crawford and Mr. Davis, you were 
in your current positions at the time that the original issuance 
of subordinated debentures by American Continental Corporation was 
approved in 1986; is that correct? 
MR. WILLIAM J. CRAWFORD: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'fON: And subsequently, also th•= second 
issuance of 19887 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Could you, Mr. Crawford, tell the 
Committee how you become aware of that issuance and what 
involvement your Department had? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well, nuwbc:>r one, the Department has no 
authority to approve subordinated debt. It only has the authority 
to approve its inclusion in net worth, and so we were not 
involved. 
The first time we learned that they were selling the 
subordinated debt in the savings and loan offices, I believe, was 
through an ad in the newspaper. I think it was the Herald Expres~ 
in December of --December 16th of '86, and we corresponded with 
them and told them that they needed our approval to use the 
premises of the Lincoln Savings and Loan for that purpose, and 
they disputed the fact that they even needed our approval. They 
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used the fact that the federal law contained a provision for what 
they called de minimus leases, which were minimal space like desk 
space, and they djdn' l f;ven require federal 1 and so they 
didn't require our approval. 
But our Chief Examiner at the time disagreed with that, 
and we notified them that they did need our approval. Then they 
applied and an approval was given to sel that. It did not come 
up to the upper level in the Department for approval. 
Mr. Davis and I, the first time we really learned about 
the sale of this sub-debt in the offices, we were on our way to 
and when we got to the office, we asked about it. We found out 
that they had approved a sublease for that purpose, and we ordered 
the examiners to go out and shop the associations, the 
associations at various offices, and we had a number of examiners 
that did that. We also had sent some relatives out to shop to 
of the association involved in sell the instruments at the 
time, and so that -- We satisfied ourselves at that time. 
However, we were concerned that there could be some 
misunderstanding, and we didn't want that to , so we sent a 
letter to the association. 
To begin with the reason we didn't revoke it to begin 
with was that there was a contractual relationship between the two 
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organizations, and we didn't want to be sued for interfering with 
a contractual relationship at that time, so we sent a letter to 
them. The lease was to be up -- The lease was for selling the 
first $200 million, shelf registration or August first, 1988, 
whichever occurred first, so in May, in order for them not to be 
surprised in August that we wouldn't renew the lease, we sent them 
a letter in May that we would not approve the renewal. Then they 
filed a formal application with us, and I believe that Mr, Davis 
can answer more about it because he supervised the correspondence 
and the meetings that were held with them and their attorneys at 
that time. 
So if Mr. Davis would like. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. Mr. Davis. What time period 
are we talking about again? 
MR. WILLIAM D. DAVIS: That filed the application 
to renew the lease? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The original lease. 
MR. DAVIS: It was May 27, 1988. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: That was the renewal? And the first 
lease was, again, when? 
MR. DAVIS: December 16, 1986, was the date, I believe. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. All right. So, in December, 
1986, they received approval from your Department to that is 
ACC -- to sell on the premises of Lincoln Savings these junk 
bonds; is that right? 
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MR. DAVIS: •rhat's correct. 'l'he approval was given at 
t. ho Ch io I r·:xam i nnr I ove l . It tH fairly routine. 
CHAI.RMAN ,JOHNS'l'ON: 1::> thLs unustwl, or typical, to 
receive these kinds of requests? 
MR. DAVIS: I think it was typical. In terms of getting 
a judgment at that level, it was unusual and unique, in fact, that 
somebody would want to sell the sub-deb product in the offices. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: That was unusual? 
MR. DAVIS: It was unusual, yes, although it had been 
done before, and there were many other financial products sold in 
financial institution's lobbies that were uninsured so 
in that sense ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Are you aware of any savings and 
was one sole product that was sold that was uninsured and that was 
an instrument created by the parent of the association? 
MR. DAVIS: I'm aware of one other instance. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What would that be? 
MR. DAVIS: I believe it was a small savings and loan in 
Santa Barbara County that sold sub-debt in their lobby. 
Perhaps the difference would be that it was the savings 
and loan's issuance not the company. I don't recall, 
but it was a very similar circumstance. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Anyway, do you have particular 
concerns for these kinds of offering or not? 
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MR. DAVIS: Yes, we do. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So the approval was given in 
December of 1986, and then at a point later in time -- Mr. 
Crawford, I know, you just testified to it, but I can't recall 
when it occurred -- you became concerned about confusion on the 
part of customers, and you sent some people in to examine how they 
• were selling these. When would that have occurred, roughly? 
MR. DAVIS: •rhat was in February of '88, and pr:Jbably 
March, too, of '88. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So they went all the way through '87 
then, as far as you know, selling the bonds in the institutions; 
is that right? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes, and I might say that we have not 
ever received a written or verbal complaint about the subordinated 
debt from anyone. We log compla s in the office, and if anybody 
calls in, we ask them to send in a written complaint, and then we 
investigate it. 
So stimulating this investigation was purely on our own, 
and probably because Mr. Davis and I both have supervised offices 
in Seal Beach Leisure World, and Laguna Hills Leisure World, and 
we know elderly people pretty well. 
MR. DAVIS: I might just point out that the perspective 
that we offered, and frankly this unique ability didn't happen in 
our staff, both Commissioner Crawford and myself spent our entire 
careers in the industry, and the savings and loan associations 
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that we worked at had offices in retirement communities, and we 
became experts. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Give us a sense, if you would, 
briefly, of what you worry about in a Leisure World or retirement 
community where you have a financial institution. 
MR. CRAWFORD: Well, for one thing, you have a 
marketplace that, in terms of a savings market, is very lucrative 
because the people are retired. They're not interested in 
investments as such. They their money, as the gentleman 
explained, in conservative investments, usually insured savings 
accounts, and they do live on that income, and it them, 
and they try to get the highest possible yield they can. 
When they come in and see a product that pays a higher 
rate of interest and it's in their institution, they think, 
perhaps just the sense that their bank is offering it, -- that 
regardless of what they read and what they're told, it's their 
bank that's offering this product. And that's the sensitivity 
that we had, and it was only because of our insight, from being in 
the industry and in dealing with that population, that we did have 
it 1 SO • • • 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: As a result, then, when you became 
aware of the radio ads that were encouraging people to come in and 
buy this subordinated debt in the lobbies of savings and loan 
institutions, you sent some people out to check on it, and you had 
some concerns and advised them to be sure that they were obeying 
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the rules, but then the was due to run out in a few 
months, in 1988, May of '88; is that right? 
MR. CRAWFORD: August 1st o '88 or when they sold the 
$200 million, whichever came first. 
MR. DAVIS: We advised them of that fact in May. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You advised them in May that you 
would not renew it, and you had made a decision that it was just 
plain safer to have those bonds sold off the premises; is that 
right? 
MR. CRAWFORD: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Now, at what point did you make your 
concerns known to the Department of Corporations? 
MR. CRAWFORD: We were not talking about the sublease 
with the Department of Corporations. Our concern was that it 
and May 1st of 1988, I had written a letter and maybe I can't talk 
about that. Can I -- Forget it. 860-what? 9 or 1? 
Anyway, I can't ... 
MR. DAVIS: We're restrained by 8009 of the California 
Financial Code, which is a confidentiality statute where we're not 
really permitted to talk about items we learn through examination 
and that process, so our scope is fairly narrow, and we've been 
cautioned by counsel. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, we're not asking -- Maybe it 
wouldn't violate any of the confidentiality statute. What we're 
trying to get at -- and you tell me how you can best answer it --
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is, you're a regulator for state chartered savings and loan 
institutions. At what point were you concerned about Lincoln 
Savings as an institution? And then, we're also interested, 
because this hearing is focused on the bonds, at what point you 
shared whatever your concerns were with that Department, which had 
a different responsibility but they were linked. 
MR. CRAWFORD: Our concern began in 1985, and it built 
up over a period of time, and the only thing that I can discuss is 
the filings of American Continental with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the filings of the savings and loan with 
the Federal Home Loan Bank that are public record and are 
disseminated through Sheshunoff and Kaplan and Smith, and various 
statistical services that make analysis. So based on that, and 
not examinations, we were concerned about the trends of this 
company, that it tended -- The way you perpetuate a business is 
through profits, and the profits of this company did not seem to 
be quality profits, nor were they core profits like the other 
people in the industry, nor were they investing the money in a 
traditional way. They were investing it in non-traditional ways, 
which is a red flag, and at one time, an analysis made in '88, 
this company only had 4 percent of its assets invested in consumer 
well, 3.94% of its assets invested in either consumer loans, 1-
to 4-family unit loans, or resident income loans -- 4% of its 
assets it had invested in that. 
Now it had mortgage backed securities. In fact, in one 
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15-rnonth period, I believe, they only made 11 horne loans, arld 5 of 
them were to insiders. So when you see a pattern, there's an 
early warning system in your mind, and this company's early 
warning system lights were flashing. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Your Department of Savings and Loan, 
I assume, is in regular communication with the Federal Horne Loan 
Bank Board, which regulates both state- and federally-chartered 
institutions in its responsibility, particularly with reEpect to 
the federal insurance fund? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: The San Francisco office of the 
Federal Horne Loan Bank Board is charged with responsibility for 
institutions in California; is that correct? 
MR. CRAWFORD: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: this period of '85, '86, '87, 
into '88, your Department would have been in communication, I 
assume, with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. So you were aware 
of the protracted audiL begun in 1986 by the Federal Horne Loan 
Bank Board office in San Francisco? 
MR. CRAWFORD: It's widely known now that the Federal 
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco prepared and sent to Washington a 
recommendation for conservatorship for Lincoln Savings and the 
state of California concurred with that recommendation. 
CHAIRMAN ~JOHNSTON: At what time would that have been? 
MR. CRAWFORD: I believe that the recommendation was 
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sometime 
MR. DAVIS: May 8, 1987. They made their recommendation 
and since this has been in the press, I can say that on March 1, 
1988, we wrote a letter to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
concurring in the recommendation of the Federal Home Loan Bank of 
San Francisco based on a review of extensive files and documents 
with many pages that supported their rec:::~mmendation. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And that chapter of regulation in 
California, with respect to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
concluded in May of 1988, did it not, when the home office in 
Washington, in an extraordinarily unprecedented action, removed 
from the San Francisco office responsibility for audit and review 
of an institution in California? 
MR. CRAWFORD: I assume that was a reason that they 
asked me March 1st to write the letter to the Bank Board 
concurring in their recommendation. So yes, we both had the same 
recommendation. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Given that concern by your 
Department and concern by the federal regulator, would it be known 
to the Department of Corporations, the fragile financial health of 
this institution while it reviewed either issuance number one or 
issuance number two? 
MR. CRAWFORD: I think they put a different reliance on 
auditors and the like than we do. We kind of discount audits 
quite a bit, and the trends of this company are clearly evident 
- 71 -
\;' IU. 7~ 
from the filings, 10-Q's and 10-K's, with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, but there is a disagreement on analysis, you 
know. There are some people who are recommending a certain stock 
and other people who say it's terrible, and otherwise, you'd have 
all buyers and no sellers. 
So there are disagreements between different people. 
CHAIRMAN JOfmSTON: I'm not trying to get you to 
criticize a fellow appointee of the Governor, to be sure, but what 
I am leading to, because Ms. Bender will be testifying next, is 
the question, was there information that you knew that was 
important that you did not or could not share with the Department 
of Corporations? 
MR. CRAWFORD: There is some information that we cannot 
share and some we can, and what we could share, we try to share, 
and what we couldn't share, we hctd to keep quiet about. 
MR. DAVIS: There had been a new agreement through the 
White Collar Crime Committee where there was access to each 
other's information, not only corporations but other state 
agencies, so by-and-large, we shared what we had with the 
Department. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: During the period of '87, '88, or at 
least '88, on the issuance of the second bond? 
MR. CRAWFORD: Yes, '88. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON; Okay. I think that would conclude 
my questions, Mr. Commissioner, Mr. Davis. We appreciate very 
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much your being with us today. Thank you. 
I'd like to now ask Ms. Christine Bender, Commissioner 
of the Department of Corporations of the State of California, to 
come to the witness table. 
I need to ask Ms. Bender whether the gentlemen who have 
joined her will be testifying or not. I don't know who they are, 
so ... 
MS. CHRISTINE BENDER: I was asked to testify. These 
gentlemen have not been asked to testify. I'll certainly tell you 
who they are. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Only for one purpose. If are 
going to testify, I'd like Mr. Miller to swear them in. 
MS. BENDER: I don't believe they'll need to testify 
now. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Okay. All right. 
MR. MILLER: Ms. Bender, you were here when I read the 
statement regarding your rights as a witness before the Committee? 
Did you understand that statement. 
MS. BENDER: Yes, I did. 
MR. MILLER: Do you agree to testify voluntarily under 
the conditions therein? 
MS. BENDER: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Would you raise your right hand, please? 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 
before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
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nothing but the truth? 
MS. BENDER: I do. 
MR. MILLER: Would you state your name and ittle for the 
record, please? 
with us. 
MS. BENDER: My name is Christine w. Bender. 
MR. MILLER: Your title, please. 
MS. BENDER: I'm Commissioner of Corporations. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Thank you, Ms. Bender, for ing 
I see you've provided the Committee with a statement. 
It appears to weigh more than five pounds. Did you intend to read 
it all today? 
MS. BENDER: Of course, I did not. I had asked the 
Committee if I'd be permitted to make an opening statement, less 
than an ounce. 
MR. JOHNSTON: You will. 
MS. BENDER: The additional documents, which have been 
provided to the Committee, represent a sampling of the materials 
that demonstrate the depth of the Department's review of ACC. I 
have not copied the entire file for several reasons. One, it 
fills a file drawer. Secondly, Mr. Suchil, your consultant, has 
reviewed our entire file, including our confidential file, and has 
had photocopies made of such items as he found interesting. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Fine. 'J'hank very much. We 
appreciate your cooperation and you are welcome to begin your 
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opening statement. 
MS. BENDER: Thank you. 
This hearing is about, in effect, a failed financial 
institution, Lincoln Savings and Loan. I'm here at the 
Committee's request to discuss the review by the Department of 
Corporations of several debt offerings made by Lincoln's parent, 
American Continental Corporation, or ACC as it's been referred to 
here. 
In fact, when I learned that this hearing would be held 1 
I wrote to Chairman Johnston more than a month ago, stating my 
intention to be here and volunteering my cooperation and 
responding to allegations that the Department did not properly 
review ACC's findings. In fact, I found it odd after that to be 
subpoenaed to appear. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, let me just tell you for the 
record, at all times you were cooperative. There's no suggestion 
that you are not by me or anyone on this Committee. It's our 
practice, however, to subpoena all witnesses and to swear them all 
in for purposes of consistency. Otherwise, we would have to 
selectively do that, and we have learned through experience that 
some people, frankly, don't come, even government employees. 
MS. BENDER: Thank you. I'm very glad to hear that. 
An examination of the facts will demonstrate that the 
Department made an extensive review of ACC's filings and documents 
in the only way possible under the law that we administer 
., t: 
·- I .) -
tJ r no 79 
concerning them. We actively sought to protect the investing 
public through that review, as I'll discuss in a moment, and also 
by imposing certain requirements on ACC to ensure that~ investors 
would have the most current information possible by requiring 
changes in ACC's advertising so investors would not be led to 
believe they were investing in insured certificates of deposit, 
and by making our own undercover investigation of ACC sales' 
practices to determine how the debt was being offered. LLt me 
briefly review the situation surrounding ACC's filings. 
The debt offerings were qualified with the Department 
and also were registered with the Federal Securities and Exchange 
Commission. In such situations, the Corporate Securities Law of 
1968, which we administer 1 requires the Department to allow a 
qualification to become effective unless we find that the offering 
is not fair, just, and 
In the case of debt offerings, the most important 
fairness standard is the 1 ihood that the debt-holders will be 
paid all principle and interest due to them. We never were able 
to find, prior to the bankruptcy filing by ACC, that ACC would not 
be able to make such payments. 
The company, that is, ACC, filed various documents with 
us, but the most important were its financial statements and 
related documentation. On their face, these materials had several 
strong points. For example, they showed shareholders' equity of 
over $136 million dollars as of December 31, 1987, net earnings of 
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over $19 million for 1987, and more importantly, that funds from 
tax savings, from the sale or refinancing of real estate, and 
possible dividends from Lincoln, would be available to meet ACC's 
debt servicing needs. 
Further, ACC's financial position was confirmed by its 
independent certified public accountants, Arthur Young and 
Company, at that time one of the Big Eight, who gave an 
unqualified opinion. 
Despite these positive prospects, we were concerned that 
reality might not support appearances, because the Department of 
Savings and Loan had raised concerns to us about Lincoln, ACC's 
major subsidiary. We took these concerns very seriously, trying 
to poke holes in them wherever any issue existed. 
When, in April of 1988, we received ACC's audited 
financial statements for year ending December 31, 1987, we 
questioned ACC almost immediately regarding the possibility that 
various assets had values significantly below the values indicated 
and also recording Lincoln's ability to pay dividends. We found, 
among other things, that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 
Washington, D.C., had agreed in May, 1988 that no write-downs 
would be required for Lincoln's real estate holdings, and in 
effect, they nullified the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank's 
1986 and 1987 review of Lincoln. 
We found, in addition, that separate and apart from 
Lincoln, ACC had a substantial body of cash assets, and assets at 
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the holding company level, readily convertible into cash from 
which it could pay its debts, and that ACC had retired three 
quarters of a billion dollars in debt from 1985 to 1987, 
frequently, prepaying that debt, and further, that the Bank Board 
had, as part of its agreement with Lincoln, and a memorandum of 
understanding entered into toward the end of May, agreed to allow 
Lincoln to pay up to $72 million in dividends to ACC in certain 
circumstances. 
However, we also contacted the Department of Savings and 
Loan. In fact, we were in continuing contact with that 
Department. We contacted the Federal Home Loan Bank in San 
Francisco, the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board in Washington, D.C., 
and various other government agencies, to see if they had any 
concrete information contradicting ours. They had none, although 
sometimes we were given verbal concerns, frequently ill-defined. 
When we asked for specific representations in writing, we were 
given nothing. Even when we asked only for oral proof of specific 
rumors, we never were told anything more than that investigations 
or examinations were under way and nothing could be substantiated 
yet and possibly not for a very long period of time. 
Under these circumstances, we had no choice under our 
law, the Corporate Securities Law, but to allow the qualification 
to go effective. This was true even though we spent hundreds of 
hours of staff time reviewing ACC's filings in 1988 and put ACC 
through what was the most extensive review process ever in my 
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experience at the Department, which is six years. 
Recently, evidence has been developing that something 
was wrong at Lincoln, but that evidence is of very recent origin. 
A Kenneth Leventhal and Company report summary now indicates --
and it's an indication only at this point -- that Lincoln and ACC 
were able to thwart effective regulation through a combination of 
various factors, such as hostility toward savings and loan 
regulators, the use or abuse of technically correct but 
substantively wrong accounting principles, wrong in their 
application, and the use of a holding company structure. Had this 
evidence been available when we were reviewing ACC's fil , it 
certainly would have added at least serious concerns to our 
review. Had the Department of Savings and Loan or the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board been able to develop this information before 
ACC's bankruptcy filing, we would have used that information in 
our review. It's impossible to say, after the fact, to what 
extent such information would have affected our review, but we 
never had an opportunity to consider such factors. 
I'd like to also address allegations and complaints that 
have been made, chiefly in the press, of influence peddling that 
have been made concerning this matter. These are empty 
allegations. No one from the Governor's Office ever contacted 
anyone at the Department of Corporations during our review of this 
filing concerning either ACC or Lincoln. The only contact from 
the Business, Transportation, and Housing Agency involved contacts 
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about Lincoln, raised by Savings and Loan Commissioner Crawford 
and no one in that Agency ever made any direction to the 
Department on this subject other than, "Pay close attention to 
ACC's filings, enforce the law, and do what's right." These three 
factors, indeed, outline all of the actions taken by the 
Department. 
Moreover, our file amply reflects that ACC's 
applications went through the Department's normal proceduzes. 
Review started with a staff counsel. To the extent any issues 
were raised to me, they were raised up through normal channels. 
More importantly, at each level of the review, the recommendation 
was confirmed to allow the qualification to go effective. No 
unusual procedures were used, other than the depth of our review, 
and no staff recommendation at any level was overruled. 
At this point, I've red answers to the six written 
questions that Chairman Johnston previously submitted to me on 
this matter, and I have, in fact, already distributed to the 
members of the Committee and to the Chair additional documents 
that we have. 
If you'd like, I will answer the questions that you 
proposed to me in writing, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We 11, we may want to do that .. 
A couple of questions based on your remarks thus far. 
One, were you involved as Deputy Commissioner in the original 
approval of the debt offering in 1986? 
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MS. BENDER: No. I wasn't, and I'm not aware that 
anyone in the Los Angeles office was. 
The file was assigned to a staff counsel named James 
Hopkins in San Francisco, who handled the application until his 
death in either late 1985 or 1987. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: You mention hundreds of hours and an 
extra effort being exerted in the review of the application to 
sell bonds in 1988. Why would you go to additional trouble in 
1988 that you didn't go to in 1986? 
MS. BENDER: Because concerns were raised to us about 
the offering that had not been raised to us previous As I say, 
I didn't have any involvement with the 1986 offering, but I've 
looked through the file and I can't see that there were any 
unusual concerns, but the file reflects at that time, March, 
1988, there had been, I believe, some negative press articles 
regarding, I think, American Continental and Lincoln Savings, and 
in addition, in mid-March, 1988, Commissioner Crawford raised his 
concerns regarding Lincoln Savings and Loan Association to my 
Chief Deputy, Wayne Simon. We immediately ordered a review of the 
file, and two days later sent an investigator under cover to one 
of the savings and loan offices to see what kind of information 
she'd be presented with if she appeared as a customer. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: And what did you find? 
MS. BENDER: Well, we have the package that our 
investigator was presented in the file. No misrepresentations 
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she was in fact, 
and some other 
say as well that 1 like the of 
the we never received any 
aints about the debentures. Since then, we've received about 
1 I believe, none of relate to 
misstatements that were made in the 1 we've received 
have concerns that may not be paid back. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Ms. Bender, heard Mr. Cotchett, 
nk, in to a memo that he says identified -- an 
o the f CoLporations that identified 
n as a Ponzi scheme. 
MS. BENDER: I he referred to a memorandum from 
Morris who, I believe s an sistant Commissioner at the 
of and Loan. He's not an of our 
That' a memo 'm familiar with. 
CHAIRMAN ,JOHNS'l'ON: How about a memo from Mr. Endo of 
? Is that daLed in April of 1988? 
MS. BENDER: There are a number of memos in the file 
from Mr. Endo on this filing. If you can tell me which one it is, 
I'll be able to answer. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, what I'm really concerned 
about is that you heard rumors that there was a risk that these 
bonds were in danger because Lincoln Savings and its parent were 
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not in good financial health and your test that you 
MS. BENDER: 's right. As far as Mr. Endo's 
memoranda in the file goes, Mr. Endo is one of our securities 
analysts. He analyzes financial statements of when 
counsel feels there's a need for the financials to be ana 
'I' he file, as has been d, is ass first to a 
staff counsel and it is not the practice to have the 
financial statements of the icant by one of our 
in-house examiners. In this case, the f le was to Mr. En do 
to review. He wrote a couple of memoranda. There's memorandum 
that's been provided to the 
dated April 7. 
s, that's an memorandum 
Those memoranda set forth, , some factors we 
as favorable tors and needed answers on. They were l 
unfavorable factors, but at that 
conclusions. They were mattrs that 
weren't even really 
ired further 
ion. There is a later hand-written memo in the file 
from Mr. Endo indicat that at the next comrnunica.tion to the 
applicants' there were 
we ought to raise and, in fact, those are followed 
dated April 29 from Mr. Riffkin 1 who was the 
to Mr. Torn some 9 items which the 





on the file, 
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CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What did you think happened? These 
were apparently a pretty bad deal for the people who bought these 
bonds, were they not? 
MS. BENDER: Anytime a company is in bankruptcy, there's 
a question as to whether anybody will get his investment back. 
When you say "What do you think happened?" I'm not 
certain quite what you're getting at. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, what's your reflection now 
that this process has resulted -- The point that we are now at is 
a company in bankruptcy, and thousands of bondholders left with 
worthless paper, evidently. 
MS. BENDER: Well, I guess I have two reactions. One is 
extreme frustration because we worked absolutely as hard as we 
could and contacted everyone we could think of to see if there was 
anything concrete anyone could give us that would contradict the 
values for assets placed on the audited financial statements and, 
in fact, the report given from Washington by the home office of 
the Federal Horne Loan Bank Board. I'm extremely frustrated that 
despite the efforts that we made, we weren't able to come up with 
anything. We're not alone in that. It required the removal of 
the management of the Lincoln Savings, the institution of a 
receiver, and the hiring of yet another independent accountant to 
come up with anything concrete, and I'm referring to the Kenneth 
Leventhal and Company report, which wasn't made available until 
July or actually, I think, not until August of this year. It was 
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completed in July. 
I guess the other reaction I have is that, to the extent 
there was a problem with ACC, there really was a problem in the 
savings and loan law in that savings and loans in California and 
other states were permitted to invest in many things other than 
doing what they had traditionally done, which was doing mortgage 
lending. 
CI~IRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you have any recommendations for 
this Committee about the standards by which you have to make a 
judgment as to the suitability of an offering to the public? I 
mean, as you describe it, correct me if I'm wrong, s you can 
find the smoking gun, you have to approve subordinated debt 
offerings to the public; is that right? 
MS. BENDER: Well, when an offering has been qualified 
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner ... 
C~IRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, tell me about that for a 
moment. What does it mean to register with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission? 
We had Mr. Crawford talk about filings that suggested 
this was a company not in good shape. Is this a ministerial or 
sort of routine filing, or was there some substantive review by 
the SEC? 
MS. BENDER: All offerings, unless they are exempt, have 
to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. I think, 
really, the Securities and Exchange Commission would be in the 
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best position to indicate what kind of review they made ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, what's your impression, 
generally, not necessarily with this one particular ... 
MS. BENDER: Of what kind of review the Securities and 
Exchange Commission makes? 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Yes. If your testimony -- well, 
this kind of filing. Is it your testimony that you relied on the 
fact that this was registered with the SEC and gave great weight 
to it? 
MS. BENDER: No. I'm not saying we relied on it at all. 
I'm saying that what our law provides is that when an offering has 
been registered with the SEC, then we are required by law to let 
that offering go effective unless we can make a finding, and the 
burden shifts to us, that the offering is not fair, just, and 
equitable. It isn't really a matter of reliance. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: 'I'hat' s precisely what I want to get 
your opinion on, the standard of fair, just, and equitable. The 
burden is on you to prove; is that right? Is that your view of it 
-- to prove that an offering is not fair, just, or equitable? 
Otherwise you approve it. Is that what you're saying? 
MS. BENDER: That's our view of the law, yes, and I 
think it's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you think that's a good law? 
MS. BENDER: Well, the Legislature made a determination 
over twenty years ago. It's the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 
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that where there has been a review by the federal agency that the 
burden should be shifted to the state agency. We get at least 
1,500 offerings a year that are filed by coordination. There are 
very few problems with them and if, because of this one failure, 
the law were to be changed, perhaps it would prevent another 
identical filing but it would present a tremendous burden on 
business. The Legislature would have w0igh that burden. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you ever deny any based on that 
standard? 
MS. BENDER: Yes we do. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: What kind of percentage ld we be 
looking at? 
MS. BENDER: A relatively small percentage. Frequently, 
in fact, the applicant will learn of problems that the Department 
has and, rather than have a denial on their record, they will 
withdraw the application and they won't sell in California. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Do you think that there was 
additional information that the Department of Savings and Loan 
could have, or should have, made available to you? 
MS. BENDER: When we were in the process of reviewing 
the application, in 1988, they were in the process of doing a 
regulatory examination of their own of Lincoln Savings 1 which I 
don't believe they have been able to complete. Had we had that 
report from them, we certainly would have considered it. I would 
have needed something concrete from them to verify the concerns 
- 87 -
that they had about such things as asset valuations. Given the 
law that we administered, we were not -- despite the sincerity of 
Saving and Loan's conviction about their view of Lincoln's 
financial strength -- able to rely on these kinds of oral 
statements. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Suppose you had denied the 
application? 
MS. BENDER: We would have been sued, and we would have 
lost ... 
CHAIRMAN JOHNS'l'ON: In your judgment, you would have 
lost. 
MS. BENDER: And we did not allow that qualification to 
go forward because we did not want to be sued, but that's not the 
point. The point is that we have lost; that we are given 
discretion to apply and we may not apply it arbitrarily or 
capriciously, and I take very seriously my charge to apply the law 
that I am required to administer. Those were the standards that 
we used. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Epple. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: When you are investigating these 
applications, do you consider where the applicant intends to sell 
these subordinated debenture? 
MS. BENDER: Where? 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPI.E: In this case, we have, as stated in 
their prospectus, intent to sell on just on the statement in the 
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prospectus, a very risky security within a savings and loan 
institution, apparently to the public and without any stipulations 
as to the ability and financial knowledge of the people that it's 
being marketed to, or to the financial status of the people that 
it's being marketed to. Do you consider that when you consider 
the fairness issue? 
MS. BENDER: In terms of cons~dering where it's being 
sold, in this instance that was the decision of the Department of 
Savings and Loan. They had approved the lease. We certainly 
would have been concerned about the fairness of the disclosure 
that was being made to people. I'm sorry if people didn't read 
the cover, but it does say in very bold type, "These things aren't 
insured," and even the advertising brochure that I saw says, "What 
is subordinate debenture? It's an uninsured, unsecured debt 
instrument." 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: On certain types of securities in 
the state of California, we have limitations as to who those can 
be offered to. Generally, I admit, those are items that are 
exempt from the application procedures, and so they're voluntarily 
entered into by the people that are producing those securities. 
In preventing something like this from happening, when a 
particular type of security is being offered, not through normal 
channels of securities, would you recommend we look to that type 
of financial or business knowledge standard? 
MS. BENDER: Well, first of all, I'm not certain what 
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you mean by "not through the normal channels." You see you can go 
into a savings and loan association and buy a number of things 
that aren't insured investments. You can buy mutual funds, you 
can buy annuities, and although they are not frequently offered by 
the parent company, there is no guarantee that those things will 
be any good at all. They're not insured investments . 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPI,E: Generally, those are only, though, 
if that particular institution is licensed as a securities dealer, 
is that not correct? I mean, unless they're their own securities, 
they generally don't sell other things than what are their own 
investment vehicles. 
MS. BENDER: Some of these products may not be 
securities, in which case that wouldn't apply. So what I'm saying 
is that there are items that are not risk-free that are sold in 
savings and loan offices. In fact, we can't make investment 
decisions for people. We try to make certain that all the 
information is 1 in fact, being made to them. We certainly would 
not want misrepresentations to be made to people. 
As I said, we sent an investigator there to find out 
what it was she was being told, but we can't make a guarantee that 
an investment will remain good. In this instance we took a look 
at the company's track record, among other things. This wasn't a 
new company. These weren't what I would consider to be junk 
bonds. They were issued by a company that had -- I think of junk 
bonds as being the kind of things you read about in the paper in 
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connection with a takeover, where a new company without any assets 
is formed and they have no backing and no track record. That 
wasn't the case here. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Pretty junky on reflection, aren't 
they? 
MS. BENDER: I'm not quite sure what you're saying. I 
think 1 Mr. Johnston, what our responsibility was, and what we 
tried to discharge, was what information we had when we qualified 
the offering and, in fact, following the offering. The last 
qualification was issued May 26th, 1988, and we continued to 
engage in discussions with other federal regulators state 
regulators, about the condition of the company to find if there 
was any concrete information they would have that would support 
revocation of the qualifications. So we continued to do that, and 
until the bankruptcy, nothing concrete was given to us. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: If you were just a bondholder and 
you found yourself holding a worthless piece of paper, and you 
heard that there was this re.gulatory apparatus that included the 
Department of Corporations, the Department of Savings and Loan, 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, all with some responsibility and some concern over a 
rather high-flying company with a savings and loan unit, and 
somehow they all said, "We discharged our responsibilities," but 
the failure nevertheless occurred and they're the ones who are the 
losers, not any of the government regulators, that would be 
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troublesome wouldn't it? 
MS. BENDER: Well, if I were a bondholder, I guess I'd 
say two things. One is, why was that savings and loan permitted 
to invest in all of these high-risk investments? What happened to 
the old law where they had to make mortgages? If there 
conservative investments in the form of deposits, why are they 
• allowed to invest them in risky things with government-backed 
money? And I think the Federal Savings and Loan Bail-Out Law, in 
fact, ref that. And the other thing I think I would say is 
that it's ly hard to discover fraud, if, in fact, that's what 
went on here. I that's why there were so many government 
agencies looking at this and being, as I have said, very 
frustrated. If anything was wrong here, it was nothing that we 
could find, it appeared after the fact, and there are allegations 
now of fraud. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, was there not more than just 
newspaper stories? There were internal memos, there were trends, 
evidence in public records that Mr. Crawford made reference to, as 
to the condition of the company, there were your own discussions 
with state and regulators. That pattern added up to 
enough concern that you became personally involved. I mean, Mr. 
Tom, your predecessor said he wasn't involved at all, didn't even 
know that Lincoln Savings or ACC had an application. 
MS. BENDER: Well, I was not either. At the time that 
he was sioner, I was Chief Deputy, and I had no specific 
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knowledge of the application in San Francisco in '86 either. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But in '88 did you take personal 
charge of this application? 
MS. BENDER: I was involved in the decision. The people 
involved included myself, my Chief Deputy, Mr. Jerry Baker, who is 
the Assistant Commissioner for Securities Regulation, the 
Supervising Counsel in Los Angeles which is the office where the 
matter was being handled, Mr. Rifkin who is an experienced staff 
counsel with, I think, over 25 years of experience with us, and 
Mr. Endo who is the Examiner. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: So, in less than a year-and-a-half, 
Lincoln Savings went from being an S&L with a parent, whose 
concerns were handled at a relatively low level with the 
Department of Corporations, in which the Deputy Commissioners and 
the Commiss had no knowledge of, to a situation where all the 
brass in the agency were reviewing this application to sell an 
additional $150 million of what proved to be junk bonds. 
MS. BENDER: That's true, and it was largely due to the 
concerns that were raised to us in March '88 by Commissioner 
Crawford. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Did Mr. Tom contact you with respect 
to their application to sell additional bonds in 1988? 
MS. BENDER: I had a couple of contacts with Mr. Tom. I 
don't know that he initiated any with me. I know that I spoke to 
him twice by phone and met with him, as well as with others, once. 
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I was among a group of people involved in the telephone 
conversation and in the meeting. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Mr. Tom, at the time, was with the 
law firm that you previously were with; is that right? 
MS. BENDER: That's right. The law firm that I left in 
1983. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: To come to work for the Department? 
MS. BENDER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I see. Did it impress you that Mr. 
Tom, or the partner, Mr. Samuelian, of the firm that you 
previously worked for, were representing this company? Did this 
add to their stature or the quality of their application, or their 
representations on its behalf? 
MS. BENDER: No. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Just another day at the office? 
MS. BENDER: Mr. Tom, along with several former 
Commissioners of Corporations, frequently appears before the 
department representing clients. It's not an unusual occurrence, 
I can name three or four who appear, and most of them on a more 
regular basis than Mr. Tom, before the Department. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Is your conclusion, then, that 
everything was done that could have been done to avoid this 
situation where these bonds have no value? 
MS. BENDER: Under the law, as it's set forth and as it 
was in effect in 1988, I don't think there is any other choice 
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that we had, and I honestly can't think of any other inquiry we 
could have made. 
CHAIRMAN ,JOHNSTON: A law, by the way, that you find no 
fault with? 
MS. BENDER: I didn't say I find no fault with it, I 
said that. if ware changed the Legislature would need to weigh the 
burden on about 1,500 businesses a yea and the havoc that would 
wreak in the capital raising markets if there were to be a 
substantial change in the review process. I think whenever there 
is a process that applies to 1,500 applicants a year, there will 
occasionally be one that is difficult to deal with or h 
doesn't come out the way you would like. The Legislature would 
have to weigh whether that's a reason to change the law. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, that's sort of an extended 
version of your earlier comment on the law, which reaches the 
conclusion, doesn't it, that, in your view, it would be very 
difficult to change the law in a practical sense, that it would 
have consequences that would be undesirable in your judgment? 
MS. BENDER: I'm just saying that in a practical sense, 
it would ... I don't think I really can make a judgment about the 
law. What I can say is that it would make things a lot more 
difficult for a lot more businesses to raise capital. And, in 
fact, generally, the complaints that are raised about state 
securit.ies regulators point out that we have the toughest state 
securities regulation in the nation, that we have a fair, just, 
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and equitable standard which is employed by a dwindling number of 
states. Many states have either the SEC's disclosure standard or 
have no jurisdiction over federally stered offerings. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: Well, in my judgment, you 
personally, and your Department generally, has a reputation of 
being a very tough regulator and a very independent one. With the 
respect to the somewhat sorry history of ACC and Lincoln Savings, 
our inquiry wants to be sure that everything that could ~ave been 
done was done, and even if it was, what we might do to avoid such 
future failures. 
Now there was an intersection of responsibilities 
because this was not just another company, it was a company with a 
financial institution that had a California charter, and that 
financial institution had federal insurance for deposits, and it 
was being used as the place to market this particular financial 
instrument. 
Additionally, you followed a Commissioner who had no 
knowledge of this process. That was his testimony. But before he 
opened his lunch bag on the first day at work nearly, after 
returning to the law firm, he was involved with your Department on 
behalf of that company, and as soon as the 12-month period ended, 
he was back in front of you personally, and others, lobbying for 
the sale of additional bonds. 
Has there ever been an occasion where you telt it 
neces to separate yourself from a decision for fear of the 
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appearance of conflict of interest? 
MS. BENDER: Yes, on a number of occasions. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: But not in this case? 
MS. BENDER: No, I have no -- the occasions on which I 
have been compelled -- and would in any. event separate myself 
from a decision, involved cases in which I have a 
finan~ial interest because my husbani's That, of 
course, is a continuing financ interest. It's a current one. 
I have not been Parker, Millken, Clark, O'Hara and 
Samuelian since 1983, more than ago. There would have 
been no reason for me not to consider matters to my 
attention by former Commissioner Tom. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: I think, Ms. Bender, you've answered 
all the questions that I have I particularly iate 
the additional volume of information you've provided and the 
access you've provided Lo Suchi.l. We will review that. We 
may have some additional ions. It is regrettable that the 
bondholders are in the situation they are currently in. Clearly, 
Lincoln savings and its 1 did not do right by those 
individuals. We want to be sure that the pattern of regulations, 
state and federal, is as t as it might be, and we will 
to look at to ensure that 
representations out as we examine how your Department 
conducted itself. 
MS. BENDER: I'd be glad to answer any further questions 
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the Committee may have. My testimony was made today under oath, 
and it would have been truthful in any event. 
CHAIRMAN JOHNSTON: We appreciat:e that. Thank you very 
much. 
We're not at a point to conclude this hearing, and we 
will make available to the public, a transcript of this hearing 
when it's prepared. In addition, we will review the materials 
that have been presented to us today, and we will make a judgment 
in the near future as to further proceedings in the investigation 
of the bonds by American Continental Corporation sold through 
Lincoln Savings. 
Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. 





WILLIAM J. CRAWFORD 
SAVINGS AND LOAN COMMISSIONER 
AND 
WILLIAM D. DAVIS 
CHIEF DtPUTY SAVINGS AND LOAN COMMISSIONER 
BEFORE 
ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAVINGS AND LOAN 
LAWS AND REGUI~TIONS 
SACRAMENTO 
AUGUST 31, 1989 
This statement is being provided to you pursuant to the 
subpoena issued on August 25, 1989, and responds to the 
questions asked which relate to the Department of Savings and 
Loan's approval of, and later denial of approval to renew, the 
lease of space in Lincoln Savings and Loan Association's 
(Lincoln) branch offices by its parent company, American 
Continental Corporation (ACC). 
1. What procedures did the Department follow in reviewing the 
applications for the lease of space in Lincoln Savings 
branches in connection with the American Continental 
Corporation subordinated debenture offerings? 
The first application filed by Lincoln to lease space to ACC 
was only after the Department had seen an advertisement in the 
Los Angeles Herald Examiner December 16, 1986, announcing that 
ACC's subordinated debentures could be purchased at Lincoln's 
branches. Lincoln took the position that since "de mininus" 
transactions did not require an application with the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board that none was required pursuant to state 
law either. An application was filed after the Department 
asserted that state law permitted no waiver of approval for an 
affiliated person transaction. The review of the application 
was then conducted by following the standard procedures for 
review of affiliated person transactions, concentrating on 
fairness to the association and protection of the public. 
The second application filed 27, 1988, was g the same 
type of review, but a determination was made this time and a 
decision issued, that was lieved that the subord ted 
debenture being marketed ACC could create a r sk to the 
publ Whether the debentures could be serv 
and repaid at maturity was known at the t the decision 
was made, but ACC could not to our satisfact its 
capacity and ability to serv and redeem the new issuances. 
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5. In the Department's experience, are subordinated 
debentures routinely offered or sold to savings and loan 
customers by sales staff located in savings and loan 
association branches? 
While subordinated debentures are not "routinely" offered or 
sold, other associations have done so. 
6. Were there complaints or inquiries to the Department from 
Lincoln Savings customers, American Continental 
Corporation subordinate debenture holders, or other 
persons concerning the advertising of, or sales practices 
for, the subordinated debentures? 
There were no written or verbal complaints filed with the 
Department . 
7. Was the Department in contact with other state or federal 
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Regulation Division reviewed for me or my Chief Deputy 
why the qualification was allowed to go effective and why we 
did not have the authority to deny the applications. 
2. The second question involves the standards or criteria 
applied in reviewing ACC's applications. 
My ion of the first question answers the general 
aspects of this question. Let me now discuss the specific 
aspects which relate to these debt offerings. 
The key fairness standard for debt offerings is the ability 
of the issuer to make payments of principal and interest. 
We reviewed the financial statements filed by ACC, including 
audited financials, and found that ACC had assets and 
earnings that would support the necessary payments. We also 
reviewed ACC's track record and found that ACC had paid 
and interest of hundreds of millions of dollars on 
debt over a period of several years. Thus, on the basis of 
ACC's financials and other documents filed, we found no 
grounds upon which to claim that ACC would not be able to 
make 1 required payments. 
normal circumstances, our inquiry would have ended at 
this point, but 1988 we pushed the inquiry much farther. 
We tried to poke holes in ACC's financials and asked them to 
answer numerous s regard. In each case, ACC 
gave us answers or additional reasonable discussion which 
supported ability to pay principal and interest. 
3. The ~1estion asks about the standards or criteYia tj~t 
the SEC would app in reviewing ACC's registration 
statement and asks for a comparison to the Department's 
review procedures. 
If you want to know about the standards the SEC applies, you 
will have to ask that agency. However, as a matter of 
information, the SEC enforces a disclosure law. 
This means that the applicant must accurately disclose all 
material items regarding the securities offering, and, 
technically speaking, the SEC requires disclosure in a 
prescribed format. The Department also requires the same 
type of disclosure but does not prescribe the format. 
Unlike Department, the SEC does not apply a fair, just 
and 
I cannot tell you whether or to what extent the SEC reviewed 
ACC's filings. As I said, you will have to ask someone from 
the SEC if you want to really know what they did and did not 
do. As I understand things, the SEC may give a filing 
American Continental 3 
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is the same review regardless of the status granted at 
SEC. However, had the SEC declined to register ACC's 
debentures, we certainly would have inquired as to why and 
we could not have the offering as a coordination. 
question asks about the Chairman Johnston's 
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but only one factor, to consider in regulating securities 
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From the viewpoint a purchaser of 
underwriter may be because 
securi t.ies of independent someone 
other than the the purchaser. benef lasts 
only for the of the offering. However, there are 
other ways to the same type of For 
example, debentures are issued pursuant to an indenture, and 
there is a trustee appointed to look out the interests 
of the debentureholders. This is indeed the case with ACC's 
debentures; First National Bank of acted as 
trustee. The trustee has a fiduciary look out for 
the interests of the debentureho for as as any 
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American Continental Corporations Page 4 
debentures remain outstanding, not just while they are being 
sold. 
6. Chairman Johnston's last question asks whether the 
Department was in contact with other state and federal 
regulators regarding ACC. 
The answer is absolutely yes. After the Department of 
savings and Loan raised concerns to us concerning Lincoln 
and ACC, we were in contact with them regularly on these 
matters. We also initiated contact with: (a) the Federal 
Home Loan Bank in San Francisco; (b) the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board in Washington, D.C.; (c) the SEC in San 
Francisco; and (d) the SEC in Washington, D.C. Ultimately, 
we even contacted the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles 
and the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C. concerning 
various issues involving ACC. We received virtually no 
information that we did not already have. The SEC and the 
Bank Board gave us nothing which we could use to act against 
ACC. The U.S. Attorney's Office informed us that they could 
not provide any information to us because their information 
came from the grand jury. The Federal Reserve Board 
informed us that they had no regulatory interest in what 
they considered to be a minor technical matter that we 
referred to them. 
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The following materials are provided to give a fair 
representation of the Depart.."TTent of Corporations' revie•tJ of 
debenture offerings made by American Continental ("ACC"). 
1. Presentations to the Savings and Loan Law and Regulation 
Subcommittee of the Assa~ly Committee on Finance and 
Insurance: 
A. Commissioner of Corporations' Opening Statement. 
B. Answers to specific questions asked in August 23, 1989 
letter from Chairman Patrick Johnston to Commissioner 
Christine W. Bender. 
2. Materials describing the de-oth of re'lie•tJ by the De~.?.r:'.::.:11e:1:. 
of Corooratians: 
A. March 13, 1989 me~orandum (24 pages) summarizing all 
actions taken by the Depar~"TTent of Corporations 
regarding ACC's debenture offerings from and after 
March 22, 1988. 
B. March 23, 1989 memorandum (3 pages) summarizing all 
c. 
D. 
taken by the Depar~"TTent of Corporations 
regarding ACC before March 22, 1988. 
Materials concerning ACC's fi~anc~a: 
~ay principal and interes~: 
1. April 29, 1988 :.er from the DeparL"TTent cf 
Corporations listing 21 ar2as requiring 
d2.scus.si::Jn .. 
2. , 1988 response from ACC's counsel (~S 
pages) responding to all 2~ items. 
3. ACC:' s audi :.ed f:.nancial statements for tje yea:: 






COMri!ISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS' 
OPEN:NG STATEMENT 
The matter at hand involves a failed institution, Lincoln Savings 
and Loan Association ("Lincoln"), and how Lincoln's failure 
caused the collapse of its parent, American Continental 
Corporation ( 11 ACC"). 
The record demonstrates that the Department of Corporations 
(the "Department") made an extensive revie•11 of ACC' s debent"l're 
filings and acted in the only way permitted by law. The 
Department was never in a position, prior to ACC's bankraptcy 
filing, to prove that the deben~ure offerings were not fair, just 
and equitable--the standard required by law. Although other 
regulators expressed concerns about ACC and Lincoln, they 
provided no specific, comprehensive evidence to the contrary and 
never told the Department anything more than that i:westigations 
were under way and that nothing could be substantiated until 
those investigations were completed. 
The major problems by Lincoln's failure must be 
resolved under state and fede:-al savings and loan la\.;s, not: u~.'~'",:­




COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS' 
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BEFORE THE 
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'#las wrong at 
000114. 
Lincoln, but that proof is of very recent origin. A Kenneth 
Leventhal Company report summary now indicates that Lincoln 
and ACC were able to thwart effective regulation through a 
combination of various factors, such as: (a) hostility toward 
savings and loan regulators; (b) the use or abuse of technically 
correct but substantively wrong accounting principles; and (c) 
the use a holding company structure. Had this evidence been 
available when we were reviewing ACC's filings, it certainly 
would have added serious concerns to our review. Had the 
Department of Savings and Loan or the Bank Board been able to 
develop this information before ACC's bankruptcy filing, we would 
have used that information in our review. It is impossible to 
say, after the fact, to what extent such information would have 
affected our review, but we never had an opportunity to consider 
such factors. 
Allegations of Influence Peddling 
of influence peddling also have been made concerning 
matter. are empty allegations. No one in the 
Governor's Off ever contacted the Department concerning ACC or 
Lincoln. The only contacts from the Business, Transportation and 
Hous ncy involved concerns about Lincoln raised by Savings 
and Loan Commissioner Crawford. No one in that Agency ever made 
any direction to the Department on this subject other than: (a) 
pay attention to ACC's filings; (b) enforce the law; and 
(c) do what is right. These three factors indeen outline all of 





amply lects that ACC's applications went through the 
's normal review procedure..::>. Review started with a 
counsel. To the extent any were raised to me, they 
up through normal channels. More importantly, at 
1 of the review, the recommendation was confirmed to 
the qualification to go effective. No unusual procedures 
used--other than the depth of our inquirJ--and no staff 
were overruled. 
At this , let me answer the sj_x written questions that 
Johnston previously submitted to me on this matter. I 
have copies of various documents that I would like to 
inclusion in the Committee's records in order to give 
a fair sampling of the depth of our review. I do not propose to 
submit all of the relevant documents, however, as one of the 
Committee's consultants previously has reviewed all of our files 
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Since a substantial percentage of the assets reflected on 
American Continental Corporation's consolidated financial 
statements is in real estate, a substantial part of which is in 
undeveloped land in the Phoenix area, the company is vulnerable 
to any softening of the real estate market in that area. 
However, the Department of Corporations was unable to disprove 
the value attributed to this real estate contained in their 
certified financial statements filed with their verified 
application. Therefore the Department of Corporations was unable 
to sustain a finding that the issuance of the subordinated 
debentures was unfair, unjust and inequitable. 
CHRONOLOGY 
The following is a chronoloTJ of events occurring over the last 
year connection with the processing of filings by this issuer: 
Mar 22, 1988 A memo from Senior Corporations Counsel Wallace M. 
wong to Chief Deputy Commissioner Wayne Simon. 
This memo contains a history of events in this 
application describing what occurred from the 
filing of the application on October 10, 1986, to 
the filing of Past Amendment Number 5 on 
November 17, 1987, was declared effective 
November 23, 1987. Corporations Counsel 
Robert L. Rifkin was the counsel who reviewed the 
Post-effective Amendment Number 5. The 
qualification which Post-effective Amendment 
Number 5 was to amend, expired November 3, 1987. 
An expired qualification cannot be post-
effectively amended. Accordingly, Post-Effective 
Amendment Number 5, filed 14 days after the 
expiration of the 12 month period was an 
inappropriate application. The Post-Effective 
Amendment Number 5 was declared effective on 
November 23, 1987. Senior Corporation Counsel 
Robert L. Rifkin inadvertently confused post-
effective Amendment Number 5 with an attempt to 
Post-effectively amend a qualification to offer 
preferred stock which he had granted on June 1, 
1987. American Continental Corporation should 
have filed an application for a qualification as 
opposed to an application for a post-effective 
a~endment. It should have paid a fee based on an 
application for a qualification as opposed to a 
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Mar 24, 1988 
Mar 24, 1988 































the Department were 
Assistant Commissioner 
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Mar 28, 1988 
Mar 29 1988 
Mar 29, 1988 
Attorneys Franklin 









Counsel Robert Rifkin. 
Application by Coordination was filed requesting 
authority to sell subordinated debentures in the 
amount of $200 million. 
application filed 
exhibit, American 
's dated June 
condensed income statement 
of American 
years 1982 through 
the prospectus were 
Lincoln Savings and 
84, 1985 and 1986. 
were third quarter 
30, ) Form 10-Q of 
which contain 
statements of 
for the 9 rnont~s 
Unaudited company-
balance sheet and income 
statements the year December 31, 1987 
were also f2..led. These statements were 
3, 1988. 
Examiner Ken Enda's memo to Senior 
Counsel Rebert L. Rifkin dated Apr~l 
conversation with Andrew 
of American 
an March 29, 1988 with 
Morton L. Riff, Senior 
Robert L. Rifkin and Senior 
Examiner Ken The discussion concerned Mr. 
Liggett's as to asset sources which 
may be used to pay the American Continental 
corporation s debentures. 
Telephone with Attorney Franklin Tarn 
and Commissioner Corporations Christine w. 
Bender, Deputy Wayne Simon, Assistant 
Commissioner L. Baker, Supervising Counsel 
Morton L. Riff, Senior Corporations Counsel Robert 
L. Rifkin, Senior Examiner Ken Enda. The 
000119 
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Re: Amer·ican l 
Mar 31, 1988 
Apr 1, 1988 
31 1988 
6 f 1988 
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net worth of $330 
, and 





Re: American Continental 
Apr 7, 1988 
Approximately 
Apr 4-7 1988 
Apr 7, 1988 


























Apr 8, 1988 














Re: American Continental 
reviewed by 
written memo 
Apr 13, 1988 Chief 
Savings and Loan 
Counsel L 
out of town. 





Apr 15, 1988 Commissioner 
William Crawford 











Apr 20, 1988 









on this date 
of Federal 
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Wayne Simon 
Re: American Continental 
Apr 27, 1988 
Apr 29, 1988 
May 3, 1988 




















May 4, 1988 
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May 18, 1988 
May 18, 1988 
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for years ended 













May 23, 1988 
May 23, 1988 
May 26, 1988 
SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE MAY 
AUTHORITY: 



































(April 22, 1988}, 
Commission, 
8, 1988 & April 










all on a 
The Department 
Loan Bank Board. As a 
Corporation was not 
of its substantial 
to inject an 
subsidiary Lincoln 
preferred stock 
Lincoln Savings and 
efforts to raise 
between $50,000,000 
June 30, 1989. 
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, 1988) Supervisory 
Board, San Francisco, 
~m~n~, Bill Davis 
Loan Commissioner 
, 1988 & May 18, 
' 22, 1988) 
Federal Home Loan 
Gr~~lata (April 7, 1988 & 
and Exchange 
Robinson, (April 8, 
and 
, Gladwin Gains, 
and Exchange 
7, 1988 & April 
25, 88 & May 
Loan Commissioner, the 
being conducted at 
and Loan Association, the 
, was in the 
taken against 
data to the 
liquid funds 
balance of its 
as March 31, 1988. In 
Department that American 
in payment of 
prepaid such 
consideration the fact 
had at that time $5 
an excess of $136 
million, and earnings 





Re: American Continental 
F. The Department was aware 




any action to close 
Association or took any 
Continental Corporation. 
May 27, 1988 
May 27, 1988 
June 6, 1988 
June 8, 1988 
statement 










1988 - this 
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in various 
American 
















Re: American Continental 







June 13, 1988 On 
Amendment 
Post-Ef 
Aug 25, 1988 
Sept 1, 1988 
in 
Sept 6, 1988 
Oct 14, 1988 
Oct 27, 1988 
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documents 
described most recent 
prospectus form 10-Q for the 
second to current 
holders debentures. In addition 
the documents enclosed with the 
letter do not constitute an amendment to American 
Continental Corporation's application for 





Joseph G. Martinez submitted a letter 
of prospectus supplement 
, 1988 a new series of 
Nov 1, 1988 Counsel Robert L. Rifkin sent 
a to Joseph G. Martinez acknowledging 
supplemental information filed October 27, 1988 
and October 28, 1988. Mr. Rifkin advised Mr. 
Martinez that the October 27 and 28 
to qualitication 
that information should be 
thereto. 
Nov 17, 1988 A memo was Corporations 
Counsel to Assistant Commissioner 
Jerry Counsel Morton L. Riff and 
Senior describing a meeting they 
had in Commissioner of Savings 
and Loan on Nov~~er 10, 1988, at 
which there was discussed the purchase of 
two hate American Continental Corporation and 
the effects of purchase on the financial 
of Continental Corporation. 
Nov 29, 1988 Letter from to Senior 
Corporations Counsel Robert L. Rifkin enclosing 
three supplement dated 
November 1988 for new Series G-13. Attorney 
Martinez out that as with all of the prior 
filings of supplements, enclosed 
prospectus supplement does not amend the currently 
effective registration statement and does not 
cause an amendment to the application for 
qualification previously declared effective 
pursuant to orders of the Department of 
dated May 26, 1988, June 13, 1988 and 







Nov 30, 1988 
Dec 7, 1988 
Dec 7, 1988 
Dec 12, 1988 







Re: American Continental 
Dec 19, 1988 






























were converted to true 
those accounts 
to any security 
made by American 
uncollateralized or 
than shares in the 
Attorney Joseph G. 
21, 1988, addressed 
L. Rifkin 
a prospectus 
14, 1988 for four new 
8 , G-14, G-15, and 




Re: American Continental 
.Jan 6, 1989 
Feb 6, 1989 
Feb 15, 1989 
A memo was 



























Feb 20, 1989 
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reconvened. 
of the 
a call to Chief 




Endo to Supervising 
results of a 
Examiner 
and Loan. The 








Corporation may have 





Wayne Simon 23 
Re: American Continental No. 304 5 
Mar 6, 1989 
early 1988 due to early retirement of some of 
its debts, and 
5. Both American Continental Corporation and 
Lincoln and Loan Association may be 
using tactics in providing current 
financial data to regulatory agencies due to 
financial problems beiny encountered by both 
American Continental Corporation and Lincoln 
Savings Loan Association. 
It should the above are rumors and 
not necessarily 
A telephone by 
Commissioner Jerry L. Baker of the Depart'llent 
Corporations to Terree Bowers of the United States 
Attorney's in Los Angeles. The call was 
made as a newspaper articles appearing 
March 2, Los Angeles Times and Wall 
Street which Terree Bowers disclosed 
that a fraud investigation of Lincoln Savings and 
Loan Association was under way by the United 
States 's office. Inquiry was made as to 
whether the US Attorney's office had any 
information would impact the Department of 
Corporations ability to revoke their qualification 
to sell subordinated debentures in this state. 
Terree Bowers that he could not share 
any had been obtained by grand 
jury subpoena. indicated that he did not 
believe that inquiry was in areas different 
from other regulatory agencies having oversight 
over the of Lincoln Savings and Loan or 
Corporation. He was 
Commissioner, L. 
any information that would 
revocation of American 
's qualification authority 








File No. 304 5211 
There was no would sustain burden of proof 
required to find of the American Continental 
Corporation's subordinated debentures was unfair, unjust or 
inequitable at the time of the issuance of the qualification and 
there has been no useable evidence developed since the 
qualification that would support its revocation. The Department 
is continuing to monitor the qualification and developments 
discussed in the and by those regulatory agencies having 
continuing overs over Lincoln Savings and Loan Association 
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contained in the March 
following is a 
Corporation 
Corporations 
, 1978 to March 22,· 
mexaorancium begins) : 
in Ohio. 
(authority} to issue 
real estate 
Savings and Loan 
$51,000,000. 
a number of notices 




from 1978 to 
U."'1der Section 
7% convertible 
15, and common stock 
securities to trade. 
that an Order 
was issued at 
on information 
could not be 
The application 
of debentures. 
appears that an Order 
.. 
was issued at 
based on 
a copy of the order could 00 0 l4j 
f le). The application 
wayne simon 
Re: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION 
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requested qualification for the sale of debentures. 
4. On approximately September 20, 1982, it appears that a 
~lalification (permit) was issued authorizing the exchange 
of notes for shares ( conclusion is based on 
information in a file memorandum; a copy of the permit 
could not be located due to the age of the file). 
5. On approximately December 2, 1982, it appears than an Order 
Consenting to the Withdrawal of Application was issued at 
the request of ACC (this conclusion is based on information 
in a file memorandum; a copy of the order could not be 
located due to the age of the file). The application 
requested qualification of unsecured debt securities. 
6. On August 19, 1983, an Order Consenting to Withdrawal of 
Application was issued. The application requested 
qualification of units consisting of notes, shares of common 
stock and warrants to purchase common stock. The order was 
issued at the request of ACC. 
7. On August 25, 1983, ACC filed a Notice under Section 
2510l(b) covering its common stock and its 10 3/4 percent 
senior notes in order to allow these outstanding securities 
to trade. 
8. On April 18, 1985, quali!ication was granted for the sale 
of senior subordinated notes due 1996, pursuant to a Sect~on 
25111 coordination application filed on February 21, 1985. 
9. On April 21, 1986, qualification was granted for the sale of 
senior debentures pursuant to a Section 25111 coordination 
application filed FebruarJ 7, 1986. 
10. on May 23, 1986, qualification was granted for the 
senior debentures pursuant to a Section 25111 coordination 
application filed on May 19, 1986. 
11. On November 3, 1986, qualification was granted for the sale 
of subordinated debentures pursuant to a Section 25111 
coordination application filed on October 10, 1986. 
12. on December 23, 1986, an Order Declaring Effectiveness of 
Amendment to Qualification was issued. This order amended 
the qualification effective on November 3, 1986 to update 
financial inforn•ation and increase dollar amount of 
secur ties qualified. 0001~1 
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, an Order Dec Effectiveness of 
ication was issued. This order amended 
fective on November 3, 1986, as amended, 
information and apparently add certain 
Declaring Effectiveness of 
was issued. This order amended 
apparently on November 3, 1986, 
the receipt of a Federal Home Loan 
apparently by Lincoln Savings and Loan 
an Order Declaring Effectiveness of 
ica tion was issued. This order amended 
effective on November 3, 1986, as 
a change in its plan of distribution of 
existing holders of securities as 
sent by Senior Corporations 
ACC to declare effective as of 
for the sale of cumulative 
described in the application 
to Section 25111. Even 
was June 1, 1987 the 
effective on an earlier date (May 18, 
to certain difficulties resulting from 
location from the Department's San 
its Los Angeles office. 
, an Order Declaring Effectiveness of 
was issued; it was signed by 
Counsel Robert L. Rifkin. See the 
chronology contained in the memorandum dated 
to you for a description of the 
to the November 23, 1987 Order 





DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS 
Los Ange s, Ca ifor~ia 
April 29, 1988 
Mr. Franklin Tom 
Attorney at Law 
Parker, Milliken, Clark, 
O'Hara & Samuelian 
333 South Hope Street, 27th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071-1488 
Reference: AMERICAN CONTINE~TAL CORPORATION 
Dear Mr. Tom: 
GEQRGC DEUKM[)IAI (~JY~rr··o~ 
1•!1 NQ 3 0 ,i 5 2_11___ 
This is to cor.firm thP telephone conversation of April 27, 1988, 
wherein Supervising Counsel Morton L. Riff, Ken Endo, and I, 
requested applicant to submit a verified amendment to its 
application of March 31, 1988, in response to the following: 
l. Directing your attention to Section 260.140.4 Title 10 
Admin is trat i ve Code, please show compliance therewith w i t!1 
re ct to the sale and issuance of the subordinated 
debentures. What are the sources of cash to meet the debt 
mat rities? 
2. Please indicate whethe.:::- tht< r'lpplicant could restructure the 
offering by means of securing the debt with specified real 
property. 
3. Is it possible for applicant restructure t!1e offQring t~ ma~~ 
the d ts s ~ r to ot~e~ debts? 
4. It s !:'"'questPd that copi<:>s of appraisals of the real 
pr rty discussed in our telephone conversation of April 25, 
1988 be submitted. 
5. Applicant was requested to make a showing as to its abil:..t.j 
to the principal and interest on the indebtedness aris:ng 
from the sale of the debentures. Also please comme!lt upon 
the restrict ns of paying off the subordinated debe!lture-s 
prior to retiring senior debts of applicant. 
6. Please indicate whether Lincoln Savings and Loan Association 
will be able to pay dividends to American Continental 
Corporation pursuant to Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
restrictions. 
lOS .\NGElES ?0005·-<091 
600 S C0MM0NWf.ALTH AVfNUE 
IJ 7Jo.;74l 
SACRAMENTO 9581~579' 
1025 P STRE~~ 
t9 \6: 445 720: 
SAN DIEGO 9710! 3697 
1 J50 <RQ~Jl S TREf r 
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7. Indicate what happens if the parent has to make contribut ns 
to Lincoln Savings and Loan Association. How s this 
impact the applicant? How are the contributions to be , 
8. Kindly indicate more specifically how applicant has 
us ng the funds coming from the sale of the debentures. Does 
it intend to continue to use incoming funds 
manner? 
9. Please indicate what contributions are to be made f the 
applicant to Lincoln Savings and Loan Associat and where 
the funds are to be obtained? Indicate specifical what is 
to be expected of the applicant in making contr but to 
the savings and loan pursuant to any agreement with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
10. Please indicate the outcome and discussions with the F .ra 
Home Loan Bank Board resulting in any agreeme 
ll. Please submit in format ion as to what values the Crescent 
Bote of Phoenix and the Phot-nician Resort are reflected in 
the financial statements as of 12-31-87. In addition, please 
indicate the appraised values of such properties and name,,who 
12. 
made the appraisals. ~t •ee. 
Please submit copies 
E change Commission 
conversation. 
of comments from the Securities 
as indicated in our tel 
13. If applicant has any forecast; it wishes to submit such wculj 
be helpful. 
14. Please indicate the maximum principal amount of debe!"'.t Jr<?s wJ..k_, 
remain to be sold pursuant to the authority now be iny 
requested. Will that $200,000,000 principal amount set fort:--, 
15. 
in the prospectus be reduced by the amount heretofore issued? 
Kind submit duplicate 
exhibits. As indicated, 
Sav1ngs and Loan 
copies of the 
these will be 
application and 
forwarded to 
16. With respect to f inancials, it is requested applicant submit 
financials which are not consolidated and would be excl sive 
that of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association. These 
financials would be inclusive of American Continental 
Corpor:at ion and subsidiaries. If applicant can not submi <:. 
non-consolidated financials, it may file applicant's 
-2- 001 
Mr. Franklin Tom 
R~: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION Fil~ No. 304 5211 
consolidat~d financials ir1cluding that of its subsidiar-i~?s 
exclusive of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, as of 
12-31-87, and consolidated income statements for two or three 
years. 
17. please submit a schedule of maturities of the debts of 
applicant by year for the entire term that the subordinated 
debentures will be outstanding. 
18. Please identify the sources available for the payment of 
applicant's debts. Also indicate whether any portion of the 
proceeds from the proposed debenture offering will be used to 
reduce the debts of the applicant. 
19. With respect to Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, the 
Department requests quarterly statements which are cur:::-er:t 
for the period January 1988 through March 1988, and for th~=> 
earlier period of January 1987 through March 1987 be 
submitted. In addition the •call" report - the monthly 
reports for the period indicated above is r?quested. 
20. The 10-Q pel:'ta i ning to licant' s f inanci ls - consolidated 
or not - is requested i not all:'eady submit ted. Applicant 
did submit some information 4-27-88, but the notes therto 
were not submitted. 
-21. Please submit further information concer:1ing the- tax shari:Jg 
payments from Lincoln Savi:1gs and Loa:1 Association to 
applicant. Appare:1tly applicant has tax loss carry forwards 
against which the ear:1ings of Li:1coln Savings ar:e bei:1g 
offset. Please advise whether' this is bei:1g donE' pursua:-:t to 
a writ ten agreeme !1t among the con sol ted entities and 
whether thel:'e are statutory limitations imposed by any 
regulatory agencies such as the Department of Savings and 
Loan, or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
-3-
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Kindly submit the above infor~ation to this office within 10 days 
from the date hereof in the form of a verified amendment to the 
application. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT L. RIFKIN 
Senior Corporations Counsel 
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May 
Robert L. Rifkin, 
Senior Corporations Counsel 
DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS 
600 South Commonwealth Avenue 
16th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90005-4091 
Ci..AUDE ' P,U~i<(~ t;tp·t·!9'S2l 
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(213) 683-6662 
Re: Ame~ican Continental C0rporatlsr. 
File No. 304-52ll 
Dea.: Mr. Rifkin: 
Enclosed are two copies, one of which is manual 
signed, of Pre-Effective Amendment No. One to Application 
dated March 31, 1988, for Qualification by Coordination of 
the Subordinate Debentures of American Continental Corpora-
tion ("ACC"). Our amendment responds to the comments made 
in your letter dated April 29, 1988. One additional copy of 
the amendment is for your use to facilitate review at the 
Depar~~ents of Corporations or Savings and Loan. 
In addition to responding to your comments, we 
have taken this opportunity to amend the appl tion to 
amend and clarify the dollar amount of ACC Subordinate 
Debentures being qualified. As of April 30, 1988, there 
000147 
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ATTORNEYS AT I..AW 
Robe fk , Esq. 
17, 1988 
$166, 000 principal amount of securities outstandinq. 
basis of the previous maximum authorization of 
00, the unissued port as of that date amounted 
,000. Since that , additional amounts have 
ly r lican t 
time the Application 
authority will remain. 
its Application for an 
tional authoriz 0,000, 00. Upon the effectiveness 
licant intends to commence to of the 
sel of new authority. As more fully 
lained of the enclosed amendment, Applicant 
tes sell approximate $150,000,000 during the 
ar of qualification (out of a maximum issue of 
0,000), of which over $1 0,000,000 will be to refinance 
indebtedness. Thus, during next year of qualifi-
, the net increase in tedness resulting from s 
s expected to be less than $50,000,000 in a corporat 
set base $5,000,000,000. 
To referred to in the preced-
licant and files as part of 
t a rev sed registration statement which has 
show 




s been made 
he s from the registration stat'-
llcation dated Mdrch 31, 1988. Th0 
dre (l} those made to reflect the 
amount of Subordinate Debentures anr.! 
the investigation of the 
Corn.1nissicn ("SEC"). The lat::e::-
as a result of an oral comment recs:i"J<::c 
The new registra statement was originally 
iled the SEC on i 14, 1988, substantially earlier 
than ld ordinari be the case based upon Applicant's 
intended schedule for the ut ization of such financing, in 
order to the uncertain timing for review at the 
S of the SEC's investigation. Amendmen~ 
9, 1988. We note that Rule 260.111.1 
t the applic tion should have been filed with the 
t within 20 s fol the original SEC filinq. 
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ArT"ORNE.:YS AT LAW 
Robert Rifkin, Esq. 
M, t '/ l 7 , l 'l ll H 
P ,1'J'=~ Thrc·e 
and requests the Co~~issioner's order waiving same. Appli-
cant waives the automatic effectiveness provisions of 
subdivision (c) of Section 25111 of the Corporate Securities 
Law of 1968. 
We also note that the Commissioner's order for the 
existing qualification expires by its terms on May 29, 1988 . 
Since this termination date is in the middle of the Memor l 
Day holiday, and given the shortage of time remaining tc 
review the amendment, we respectfully suggest that it may be 
in the ar~~ent's and Applicant's best interests fer the 
Department t:J arnend the Co1n.rnissioner' s order to extend the 
effectiveness through June 3, 1988, the following Friday. 
We regret that we were unable to file this amendment earlie~ 
to allow the Department more review time, but the extensive-
ness of the Department's comments, as well as intervening 
other matters, consumed an unanticipated number of days. 
Please contact Joe Martinez at 683-6583 or the 
undersigned at 683-6662 if you require any additional material 
or have any questions. Moreover, we and represen ta ti 'Tes of 
Applicant are available to meet with you at any time to 
assist in this matter. 
yours, 
~.- 'f.,. J! ,-" ,. 
c" I-t~-· c.~~~-~._,. J 
/Franklin Tom 
F'I'/pjb 
cc: Robert J. Kielty, Esq. 
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000150 
Applicant he amends ion for Qualifica-
tion by Coordination heretofore the Department of 
Corporations on March 31, 1988 to reflect the istration by 
Applicant of an add ional $300 mill of Subordinate Debentures, 
of which Applicant seeks to qualify hereby $ lion. In 
connection therewith, Applicant by this 
reference the following documents as Exhibits A-1, 
A-2 and A-3: 
1. Form S-2 Registration Statement filed with the SEC 
on April 14, 1988 the of $300 million of 
Subordinate Debentures (marked to reflect changes from current 
Registration Statement covering $200 million offering) ; 
2. Pre-Effective Amendment No. 1 to Form S-2 
Registration Statement filed with the SEC on May 9, 1988 (marked 
to reflect changes from Exhibit A-1); 
3. Form T-1, Statement of Eligib ity and Qualif 
tion under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, filed with the SEC on 
May 9, 1988. 
licant hereby further amends Application for 
Qualificat by Coordination heretofore filed with the Department 
on March 31, 1988 to incorporate therein the information 
by the Department in its letter to the Applicant dated April 29, 
1988. The information set forth below is numbered to correspond 
with the requests contained in the Department's letter. 
a. Debt Reaulations 
Section 260.140 provides that the standards set for~h 1~ 
e 4 "are to in the situations 
for the exercise 's 
to the if 11 [Emphas Added]. The 
for a sinking fund nor has it 
restricted the creation of liens on its property or the creat 
of other funded debt, beyond those significant restrictions 
imposed by state and savings and loan regulations. 
Furthermore, the Appl bel such prov~s~ons are 
unnecessary and inappropriate view of the following facts: 
1) Subordinated Debt Is An Accepted Financing Mediu~ 
in the Marketplace. The use of unsecured and other 
subordinated debt a common financing mechanism in 
corporate cap izations, particularly with seasoned 
, and such securities have been readily accepted in 
the and itutional marketplace. Many such issues 
have been qualified in California, and numerous others are 
JG~.AML02. 001 1 000151 
Net Earnings 
Cash Flow 






of proven financial capability. It 
a consistently profitable basis since 
Of at equal importance is the 
icant oys a very signi positive net 
enables it to more easily handle debt service 
most nonfinancial companies of 
power capital. "Net cash 
increased by non-cash expenses 
The following schedule 












Shows Its Capability to 
icant has demonstrated its 
as evidenced by the 
corporate has never 
the payment of , to make any 
when due andjor at maturity. In fact, 
prepaid corporate indebtedness 
advantage of lower ing market rates in certain 
or for other reasons. In the past three years 
7), principal prepayments of over $750 million in the 
have been made. (See the chart in b.2(b) of this 
years, 
of numerous u.s. 
as Exhib l.a.l and l.a.2 
from the two most recent ratings, respectively 
was not rated the financial compan category 
the earl year) , which shows that Applicant was rated no 
than fourth place in the nation in each industry 
in which it was included. These ratings are based 
a number of empirical financial criteria, and the 
JG'M..l\i."JfLO 2 • 0 01 2 00152 
• 
results validate the 
seasoned with 
Fund. The 
with their terms, 






The practical effect of the maturities is 
that the entire , which as of 1 30, 1988 led 
$166,569,000, payable over the ten "life" of 
issue in a manner similar to that a sinking or 
mandatory 
6) 
the acqu of 
of debt is subject to FHLBB 
sought by filing an annual 
issued during the following 
to the FHLBB for approval 
the debt to be 
cap , real estate 
maximum amount of debt 
Applicant's 1988 debt 
and would, in Appl 







In the event that the 
Subordinate Debentures 
JGMAML02.00l 
reserves to the 
them 
were to ret the 
of long-te~ debt, i~ 
000153 
would have a number of alternative and cumulat 




to 50% of 
that any 
may be deferred and paid 
provision that in no event 
fact or the opinion of 
Savings to fail to meet 
Until 
FHLBB's 1986 
FHLBB not to pay 




During 1986, Savings and 
a tax sharing which 
icant the amount income tax 
for such taxes computed, for 
' Lincoln a 
on a stand alone bas 
corresponding amount 
from losses of 













ion at December 
JG~.k."1LO 2 • 0 1 




1984, Lincoln Sav 


























reflects the on of 
brief description at December 31, 















December 31, 1987 which 
and ln Savings. A 
1987 of each asset 
the Subordinate Debent~res 
(i) Cash on hand and short-term cash ($36.2 
1 ) . cash 90-day 
u.s. (See Item 7 
(ii) estate ( $4 3. 0 
on the sale 
of in Phoen 
. ) 
JGI1AML02. 001 5 000155 





(i.v) Marketabl equi 







l of loans 
over $27 llion 
over $176 mill or more 
of Subordinate Debentures 
b) 
Applicant's 1 
refinancing. A history 
summarized as follows: 
Year Amount 
Issued Issued 
1976 $ 12,000,000 
1981 7,875,000 
1 8 22,500,00 












Approximately $750,000,000 of debt has been 
3-year period from 1985 through 1987. All 
has been repaid in cash ( the 
debentures) through re , and 
cash. The foregoing demonstrates 


















property as coll 
purchaser, ler and 
its experience 
number of properties, 
it continues to 
company owning 









maturity of the debt and the 
cannot be matched, 
collateral debt 







to match the 
and loan 











2 above, the 
affected by any 
It 
to the securities 
of adversely affect 
Subordinate Debentures. 
to be ified on 
to restructure the 
specified real 
experienced 
It has utilized 
and develop a substantial 
has sold and some of which 
However, unl a manufacturing 
not its real 
the nature of inventory. lt 
the 
Moreover, Applicant cannot 
estate holding owned from 
to an accounts receivable 
's real estate is not 






real property for 
the Subordinate 
nature of the 
offer the 
as a result of 
or secured 
debt is ly 
contain 
to others. As 
would also be 
position. 
a senior position 
have the effect 
will preserve the equal 
outstanding 




























The average of the 
il 30, 1988 was 3.1 years. 









See Item No. 1 above for a discussion of Applicant's 
sources of cash and ability to pay the principal and interest 
arising from the sale of the Subordinate Debentures. 
There are no restrictions on Applicant's ability to 
retire the Subordinate Debentures prior to the retirement of 
Applicant's senior debt. 
Item 6 - Dividends From Lincoln Savinas. 
See Item No. 1 above. 
Item 7 - ~apital Contributions to Lincoln Savings . 
The present capital position of Lincoln Savings is verJ 
strong. The regulatory net worth of Lincoln Savings of 
$252,525,000 at December 31, 1987 is equal to 6.7% of regulatory 
liabilities, which compares favorably to the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board requirement of 3%. 
In connection with Lincoln Savings' discussions with the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board to resolve the 1986 examination by 
the Bank Board, Applicant has offered to make a cash contribution 
of $10,000,000 toward the capital of Lincoln Savings as a part of 
a complete resolution of that examination. The $10,000,000 
contribution would be funded from the Applicant'~ existing cash 
and cash equivalent investments which, as of December 31, 1987 
based upon the financial statements of Applicant less Lincoln 









Since such a cash contribution would be premised upon a 
complete resolution of the 1986 examination, Lincoln Savings' 
current undertaking to the FHLBB to refrain from paying dividends 
to Applicant pending such resolution would expire. Ac8ordingly, 
Lincoln Savings would have the capacity without prior regulatory 
approval tcr,pay dividends to icant in an amount up to 
~ $72,000,000. Lincoln Savings has made no determination whether tc:, 
causg_a__dividend to be paid in such event and, if so, in what 
, amount. 
If Applicant were to make the $10,000,000 contribution 
to Lincoln savings, such a capital infusion would support deposit 
growth at Lincoln Savings of $200,000,000 based upon a 
JGHAML02.001 9 000159 
See Item No. 7 
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the 1986 
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Debentures sued 






preparation by the parties of a Memorandum f Understanding. T~e 
Memorandum contemplates the follow 
" . agreement by 
reserves with respect to certa 
(these reserves are reflected 
financial statements at December 
Lincoln Savings' capital 
"contingency factor" to reflect speci 
identified assets; a $10,000,000 cash 
Company to the capital of Lincoln 
Lincoln Savings to use its best efforts 
of its preferred stock or subordinated 
increase in Lincoln Savings' " 
requirement with respect to a 
investments (provided that such 
Lincoln Savings' net worth requirement to 
of total regulatory liabilities); ect 
the other terms of the memorandum, 
Savings to maintain aggregate 
amounts up to one-th of 
Lincoln savings to submit a 
advise Lincoln Savings' Principal 
modifications of, or deviations from, the 
undertaking by Lincoln Savings to comply 
practices and procedures with to 
loan underwritings and investment 
undertaking by Lincoln Savings to 
under#riting procedures regarding 
securities." 
/
_,While management of Appl 
agreement on the Memorandum 
, there is no assurance that the FHLBB 
I of Understanding in the 
i was advised by FHLBB 
'\,_ terms--of the Memorandum of Understanding 
- FHLBB. - Applicant has been orally 
th~emorandum of Understanding which 
revised affect and relate only to 
affect the financial ion of 
Item 11. -
The book value of 
The Phoenician Resort as re 
Applicant at December 31, 1987, 

















45% interest in the t~o to an unrelated 
This 45% minor interest separately reflected on 
December 31, 1987 balance sheet as Interest 
Operations" in the amount of $92,902,000. 




rt was sold to 
the t·;;o 
for cash in the 
$74,486,000 of funds placed amount of $173, 50,000 
into escrow to cover the cost of completion for The 
recorded a $12,880,000 gain on Resort. The 
the 0 000 of will be 
JGMfu'1L02. 001 
excess of 
of the hotel 




by Applicant of a 45% 
transaction much more current than 
upon the current configuration of The 
for cash payment of the purchase 
minority shareholder's 
costs. Based 
have an indicated combined 
o,ooo,ooo at 
of investigation, the 
( 
1
1 ) three subpoenas 
1988 and 22, 1988, 
of Applicant in 
, and practices used to 
of the allowances for loan 
estate investments and actual 
such al : certain identifying 
ated to the accounts of Applicant's officers and 
documents related to the and sales of 
ies and of particular entities. 
the SEC with the information requested in 
forth all 1 "(t]his inquiry 
construed as an by the SEC or its staff 
of law has occurred," but is simply a 
The SEC inquiry requests information 
in the 1986 FHLBB 
although the SEC's investigation 
covered by the 1986 FHLBB 
1986 examination report of 
The examination report sets forth 
matters raised by the FHLBB during the 
12 





negotiating with the FHLBB to 
before them. With to 
Applicant believes that there 
and that there are no mat 
financial statements. 
ion 
Attached hereto as its 
respectively, are the three subpoenas 
letter from the SEC's Division of 
12 1 12.2, 12.3 and 12.4, 
ferenced above and a 
the registration statement on Form S-2 
April 25, 1988. 
related to 
SEC on 
Attached hereto as Exhibits 12.5 and 
incorporated herein by this reference are 
correspondence between the SEC's Division of 
and 
the 
and the Applicant relating to Applicant's Registration 
covering the $300 million offering. In an 
comment by the SEC, Applicant amended Registration 
Finance 
Statement 
to clarify the scope of the SEC's investigation (see p. 3 
&~endment No. 1 to Registration Statement filed on May 9, 
Exhibit A-2 hereto). No other written comments from the Division 
of Corporate Finance have been received by Applicant. 
Item 13 - Forecasts. 
Applicant has not prepared any such forecasts. 
Item 14 -
As of April 30, 1988, $166 569,000 of 
Debentures had been sold under the icant's $200 1 shelf 
registration, leaving $33,431,000 In , Appl 
is hereby applying to ~Jali offer and sale $150 million 
of Subordinate Debentures of which a amount will be 
used to repay existing Subordinate Debentures (See Item 8 
hereof) . 
Item 15 -
was A duplicate copy of the pending 
delivered to the Department of Corporations 
dated May 3, 1988 from our counsel. An 
under cover of lette~ 
Amendment is also filed herewith. 
Item 16 -
A balance sheet as of 
of Operations for the 12-month 
1986 and 1987 reflect the 
(consolidated), Lincoln Sav 
(consolidated) of 







copy of this 
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hereto as Exhibit 16.1 and are incorporated herein by this 
reference. Attached as Exhibit 16.2 and incorporated 
by th reference are Statements of Changes in Financial 
Position (SCFP) for the years ended December 31, 1987, 1986 and 
1985 which represent the SCFP from the parent-only financial 
statements in the Company's annual filings on Form 10-K. 
The format of Exhibit 16.2 differs from the balance sheets and 
income statements submitted in Exhibit 16.1 because of the 
differences between the consolidated SCFP and Lincoln Savings' 
SCFP (principally the result of "netting" changes in certain asset 
and liability accounts the Applicant's consolidated filing). 
Said statements do not include certain subsidiaries of Applicant 
which would have been included in Applicant's consolidated 
financial statements exclusive of Lincoln Savings and its 
subsidiaries, but such subsidiaries not so included are not 
individually or in the aggregate material to the Applicant's 
financial position. 
Item 17 - Schedule of Maturities. 
The scheduled long-term debt maturities of Applicant, 
as of April 30, 1988, including the Subordinate Debentures, are 
set forth in the following table. 
(in thousands) 
Maturity Subordinate Other Total 
Pate Q.ebentures pebt pebt 
1988 $ 19,926 $ 2,556 $ 22,482 
1989 44,609 3,898 48,507 
1990 44,509 37,724 82,233 
1991 10,316 8,878 19,194 
1992 4,521 3,125 7,646 
1993 16,255 2,960 19,215 
1994 9,093 3,019 12,112 
1995 10,883 10,883 
1996 805 805 
1997 17,340 17,340 
After 1997 136,581 136,581 
Sl66.569 S2lQ d2~ SJ76,996 
Item 18 - ~ources for Repayment and Use of Proceeds. 
The sources of funds available for the payment of 
Applicant's debts are discussed in Item No. 1. Applicant intends 
to continue to retire existing debt, as discussed in Item 8 
hereof, at approximately the same rate as it has in the past. 




1988 and March 31 and 
of Lincoln Savings for the 
March, 1987 and for the 
attached hereto as Exhib 
reference. Attached hereto as 
respectively, and incorporated 
Federal Home Loan 
Lincoln Savings with the FHLBB for the 
the following months of 1987 and 1988: 
March. 
In response to the 
letter of May 3, 1988, attached 


















, and are 
f 
1 
The Applicant has duly caused this application to be 
signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly 
authorized. 
AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION 
(Title) 
I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws 
of the State of Cali:ornia that I have read this applica~ion 
and the exhibits thereto and know the contents thereof, and 
that the statements therein are true and correct. 






ARTHUR YOUNG & COMPA."'! 
Phoenix, Arizona 
March 2). 1988 
were e::wnined by other 
6 
ARTHUR ANDERSEN &. Co. 
PHOE!'iiX. ARIZONA 
To the Board of Directors and Shariholders 
of AMERICAN CONIINEN'!AL CORPORA'IION: 
We have examined the consolidated balance sheet (not included herein) of 
American Continental Corporation (an Ohio corporation) and subsidiaries as of 
December 31, 1985, and the related consolidated statements of operations, 
shareholders' equity and changes in financial position for the year then 
ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the accounting 
records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the 
circumstances. 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the 
financial position of American Continental Corporation and subsidiaries as of 
December 31, 1985, and the results of their operations and Changes in their 
financial position for the year then ended, in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of t~e 
preceding year. 
-c. 
AR'!HUR ANDERSEN & CO • 
Phoenix, Arizona, 





CORPORATION ~'ID SUBSIDIARIES 
Cash and c.sh eqwvalems (!nd~  c:ash of S9i928 and S71,590 at 
December 31. 9iJ7 and 1986, ~)(Note D) . . . . ....... . 
Securities pwrlwed UI!tdu ~!.$ lD resell (Note E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
~t securi~ry ~~and SU0.089 at 
December 31.. 9iJ7 md ~)(Note G) . . . . . . ........ . 
Investment secut~lie--debt (e$lmned ~ val\11!: Sl.2Z4.73Z and ~s at 
December 31. 1987 md 1986. ~)(Note G) .................... . 
Mortgage-tni::ked oertific:ates (~ ~ vallll!: S483,l66 2nd S)400 at 
December 31. W md 1986. res~) (Note F) . . ............. . 
Mo~ and o!.l'w!:r loaru net (Note H) ...... . 
Mo~ IOIUU :u:x:ounl.fd for as real estate ~nts or tomt W!ntl.lreS (Note A) 
Other rete~v:lbles (Note A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... . 
Real est.::Ue IIMstments (Note I) . .. . . . . .. .. . . . . .. .. .. . . . . . .. 
Investment in and~ to~ :Ufiliates (Note.~) . . . . . ... 
Property, buildings and net .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. 
Prepaid expenses and otheussets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Excess of cost OYer neussets :acql.li.m:!, net (Note C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Savings deposits (Note J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . 
Shon-tmn bof!'O'\\ings (Note K) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Accounts ptyable and :occrued expenses . . . . . . . 
Long-term debt (Note L) . . .. 
Policyholder liabilities (Note A) 
Deferred income tuts 0) 
Commitments and rnnrmo"!'V1-
1 M.i.nonty interest ln hotel """'""""'" 
Shareholders' 
Preferred swd, H par value, 19.998.000 slu.res :wthoru:ed (Note N) 
Exchangeable Preferred 
issued-1,607,620 slu.res in 1987 and 1.609.000 in 1986 . 
Convemble Preferred sux:k:, 
issl.led-147 ,519 slu.res In 'f%7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Common SUlek, Sill par value (Note A): 
Authori.zed-35,1)0(}.000 slu.res 
issued-17.;49,8'59 s.i:l.ares in 1:987 Md ll2'53.8il slu.res in !986 . . . . . . . . 
Capital in ~ of par value . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Markeuble equity securities reserve (Note G) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 
Reuined ............................ . 
Deferred (Note Q) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 



























AMERICAN CONTL'TENT. J. 
CORI)ORATION Al'ID SUBSIDIARIES 
lf:IJ eswe sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · · 
Interest and fees on srrings a.s.sociation loans :md mortgage-backed securioes .. 
Interest and fees from mortg2gt banlting operations ................. . 
lntertsund di\'idtnds on i.rlvestment securities .................... . 
v.l.im on sale or s.ecurities :md loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Distnbution.s from unconsolidated affiliateS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
~premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. . 
Ot.'ll!r i.ncol'ne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . 
Cost of real esw.e sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Current :md furore insur:mce benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Interest expense: 
Savings deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mortgage b2nk.ing operauons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Borrowed funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Selling, general and adrrun.istntive expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Provision for losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Wnings from continuing operations before income wes. extr:wrdin.ary item and 
cu.mul.anve effect of a ch.ange in u:counung for income wes . . . . . . .. . 
Taxes on ewungs (Note 0) ................................. . 
E:!mings from continuing operations before extraordinary item wd ClliiiUI2Uvt 
effect of a change m accounting for income uxes . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 
gam (loss~y extinguishment of debt 
(net of income ux expense (benefit) of Sl..:-63 in 1987 and (S6,60!} in !986) 
Cumul.anve effect of a ch.ange in u:counung for income uxes (Note 0) .. 
E.:urtings from continuing ope!"lllons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Discommued operaoons., net of income wes (Note B): 
loss on disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
E:!mings (loss) from operations . . . . . . . . . 
N!et~ ... . . .... 
Less preferred stock dlVJdend.s . . 
bminp applicable to common stock 
~r sl.w'e nminp (loss) appliable to common stock 
Conunwng operations before extr:wrdin.ary item and cumulative effect of a 
change in accounting for mcome uxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
Extr:wrdinary item . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . 
Cumu.!auve effect of a change in accounting for income taxes . . . ..... . 
Discontinued operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
DMd.end.s per common share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
bn ended llecrmber 31. 
196i 1986 198S 
$220.924 rz96,039 Sli9,Z!6 
16Z.Z75 B4,4SO 160,872 
29.604 87,873 102,616 
13S.937 134.906 74,231 
102,663 73.477 1!6.681 
1,243 55.952 3,4-18 
33,174 S6.Z03 
32.465 13.552 10.393 
718.285 852.452 647 .4Si ---
139.364 216,157 129,575 
35.657 58,720 
2!0,314 198,825 197.292 
29,703 74,651 90.-199 
102,721 102.023 57,223 
154,002 126,146 93.38.3 
20.536 32.496 12.6-tS 
f/)2.297 809,018 S80.620 
25.988 43.434 ()(l,g::,-
12.612 12.601 l.UOO --- ---
13.376 30.833 53..W 
2,876 (6.600) 
3.07; 
19.327 24.233 53 .. W 
(3.02~ l 
(7.76-) ---
19,317 14,233 42.542 
(6.302) ('5.549) (6. )3Z 1 
113,02'5 118.684 S36.010 
= 
s .39 s 1.36 s lJ) 
.16 (.3S) 
.17 
(. ; .. ) ---s .72 s 1.01 s 1.81 
= = s - s .10 s ----
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1 \ppliotions) of Funds 
Earnings from 
etieo: of a 
Add (deduct) ilfmli 001 
Amol'tiutioo det>Jreci:lltion 
Provision for t~ ... 
ll'ltemt credited to 
Ca!lliul.i.:zed interest. net ... 
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CORPORATION AND SlJBSIDlARIES 
future policy benefit liabilities a.t"e computed using~ as w fuwre rooruiity, in~erest and withdnw:!Js. at the ume 
of policy issuance A.mericm Fou.ndm. Life lnsur.ance ~ uses me dffioed premiwn ~n O'll:thod for bu.s1ne55 in 
force u the dale of Its acquisition AJl fuw.re policy bendil.liabilltie for poUoes ~ :!irlct dw date a.t"e C2!cu.Wed on a net 
levd premium method Universal U1e and 2l'Ulllides lLitu.re poLiq benefit lbbillties are determined based on the deposa 
method Thf: intmst rate guarantee on soch pclicies ~ rrom 4% w 1.5% for~ Ufe and an.nuitie 
The fma.nchl Accowtting Sund.Ws Board issued ~ of rl'Wldal Accoontin& Stanlhrds No. 91, "Accounting for 
Nonrefundable Fees md Casu ~ with OrigifWing Of Acquiring Loans and lrutial Direct Costs of l..ease5. ~ in 
December 1986. The pi'OV!.Sions of this swement will be 2pplied ~Y wall lending~ entererl into by the 
Company beginning with 1988 and, pn.l. requ.itt the dfferral and aroo!'tizatioo of loon origirw:ioo fees net of cerum 
direct oligmaoon costs over the Ufe of the ~ lmns as :m :uijllSUrlent oi yield, the d.fect of which has not betn 
detemuned Although the Company Ius no1 presently determloed the effect of implernenung the SU!ernent, it is expect~ to 
reduce the amount of loan ongmmon fees rtrog~'IJ.Zed. 
ltealized gains and losses mulling from furures tmUliCtioos entered into 25. and also qualll'ying u. a hedge agaJnst the 
Company's ex~ w interest rate or price risk are deferred 2nd :unortized. usmg the interest method. a>'tr the rem:ammg 
life or the asset or liability which W'3S hedged. 
Valuation allow:u\ces for estim21ed l~ are dl:zrged w opmlions when it is determined that the carrying value of the 
related asset is greater than net m.l.iz:lble value. 
Cerum 1986 iterru have been reclassified to conform to the 1987 presentation. 
In the second quarter of 1985, the Company sold its homebuilding operation in Phoenix to two former officers of the 
Company {one of whom was alw a former director) a!'ld COl'llmtnced a prog.r:;.m to phase out Its rema.aun~ homebutid 
ing oper.won in Denver. Sullsunu:illv all of the net ll.li.Set3 of di.swntinued ope!'aUOn.s h:M been liquidated Revenues trc,m 
discontinued oper.wons were S30,42SJ)OO and Sl90,893J)OO Ill l9ti6 wd 1985. respect~Velv. Income tax benefits related tu 
discontinued operations totaled S10,500DOO in l98S. 
The acquisitions of l..incoln S:Mngs and Loan ~nand AmenCI.n Founders Ufe Insurance Company were :u:coumtd 
for under the purt:h.3.se met.hod md, :w:ol'liingly, allll.li.Sets and liabilities acqu.im:i \1/'m adjusted to theu esum:ued f:ur values 
as of the date of acquisition. 
S69,8~.000 of the excess of cost ow:r the Uir value of Uncoln Savings net users is bemg :unoruzed from 6 w 2! 1e:m 
using the straight-tine method and $2lll64,000 is being amOitized over the estimated I'I!I%Wning lives of the long-tem1 
interest bearing assets acquirerl using the interest method The resnaining excess oi rost ovu Aft net users acqu1~ is be!nR 
amortized o\'er 38 years. 
F-8 000174. 
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8.estricted cash at December 31, r:1fJ md 19{16 includes ash to ~ hood ~m rtse!'\~ funds 
md t.rzll.S3C'tion aa:oont rr;:sm.oe fund.s as requin!d by !he~~ Bo:m!. 1987 also lndl!Ges in an &roW 
account for the completion of The P'hoolicia.n lesoo md to~ vmous oilier ooiiptiom.. 
At December 31, 1987. !he Company lwi ~ w~ 133,023.000 or V'l.riou! sec'Jnties and 
JU.050,000 of US. ~nt securities uOOe.r ~u t1:1 ~The l:IWiu:t value of !he securitieS :u D«ember 31. l9lf." 
approxi.rtWed !he Company's cost. The~ cal1ed b' ~ t'21eS from 55% to 725% and were convened to cash 
subsequent to year end The securities were be.ld by the ()OI.Ifl~-pl!l'tle! to the ~t. 
A.meric:ui Continental M~ Comp2ny (ACM), the~~ b:mJdng ~.sold a portion of 
the mortgages it origW!ed by poofulg such ~ md ~ sa:ured thereby wholly~ 
finance rubsidi2.ries. The finance ~ ftm.nced !be pwdwe o{ such ~ ~ the sale of bonds 
c:olhter:iliz.ed by the ~(Note These GNMA ~m: ca.rried :11 a Ollit wilJdl remits in a yield approximately 
equal to the yield on the re:!:u.ed bonds. Oi.scoonts are deferred and aa:reted to In~ Income using the interest method 
ovtr the U!e of the mo~ 
The mo~b:icked bonds wllieii by ACM m: ~le the bondholders Ul'lder limited drcumsunces and are 
allable by the issuer Wlder the conditions~ In the indentlll'a und.fr whldl the bonds wett is.sued. Outing 1987, ACM 
retired approxiln2.tely S19S,OOO,OOO principal zmount of bonds with from the sale of the undfrlvmg GNMA 
certifiateS. Approxiln2.tely S2l452.000 prindpa! amount of~ bonds by oo·tifk::ues \\1th -. market 
value or $23,588,000 :&1. Dectmber 31, 1987) m ca!b.ble in 1988 at 113% 
Mortpge-!nded certi.fic:::ues at. December 31. 1987 and 1986 m ~zed as foi!O"N'S: 
(In thousands) 
Certific:ues, securing mortgage-bacUd bonds lsrued by mo~ 
net of discounts of S908 in l98i md S8.288ln l986,lll:UUi vaiue of S35.262 
In !987 md S278.749 in 1986 
Certific:.teS, securing Eu.roi'Jond debt md other bo~ net of discount 
or Sl'ii38 in 1987, !ll2.rlt.et value of S44i.904 in 1987 ... ' ' . ' . 
()then, lMrtet value of S66.634 in !986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mortg:tge-bacited certilk:ues toullng $447,544,000 and S25139l000 were 









(In thousamb) Cost '\laluc 
Ceruf~C~teS of deposit and commercial (nper ......... s 311"1.994 s 318.994 
Bonds: 
US. treasury and government agencies ......... 345,035 
Corpor2le ......................... 560,703 
Allowance for possible losse5 ............... 
905.738 
Mark.euble equity securities: 
Preferred stoCk . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . ......... 48,055 45,075 
Common srock ... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 145,539 115,073 
Wamnts to purchase common SU>Ck . . . . . . . .. ~ 3.180 2,797 
Other ...................... ·. · · ·. · · 6,125 6,l2S 
Reserve ror lower of cost or market . ' .......... (33.1129) 
169.070 169.070 





s 127.718 $ 12:',718 
77.7,ry)7 701.133 
310,86! 3 S1. SWJ.1 
(4.900) 







At December 31. 1987 and 1986, the unrealized gains and losses in the m:ukef.able equity securities portfolio were s ).691.000 
and S 39.52DDOO and S3,i4Ul00 and Slll.J/3.000, ~- Net re:Wzed gains on markeuble eqmty secunues for l98"' were 
approxi.mately s 22.000,000. 
lm'estment securities totaling SSOS,9SWOO 2nd SS63.5SS.OOO were pla:lgerl to secure fHl.B Advances.. other borrowmgs and 




,cW.5TATE.'>1E.'m Al\1IRICA.."i CONTINEl'ITAl 
CORPORATION AND SlJBSIDlAPJES 
Mortg:t%t and other loans re1:es-...ble are suml!W'iz.ed as follows: 
(In thoos.and.s) 
Mortpge<O~ndoru.l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ·. . ... . 
Mortga.ge-u:quisition and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mo~nsuucdon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
Comme:tial, con.sume.r and other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Al!OW'al'ICf for possible losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Purchase u:counting and other discounts ............. . 















AI December 31, 1986, the Comp2.!1Y was semC!llg loans for othen tot:~Jing lpproxim:u.ely S294,20i,OOO Dunng 1987. the 
Comp2.!1Y sold servicing rights for lllloam being semced for others. Thl': pn ~u.zed the slie:s was not sigrufic:uu 
The Company !u.s the potentia! for :u1ditioru.l ~nue; on ap~y S23l,OOO,OOO of loans ;u D«ember 31. 19lf'. 
representing pwiap:uion.s in profits which !l'UY be ~upon the sale or refinandng of the re!ate{! reli pro~rr' 
Repayment of loans and rea!i:ution of wy arldit!oru.l ~nues is grnerllly expected to occur from the d 
construction or pertlWient flnancing obtained by the borrower, or from the ~e of property Additiorul intere:st re;ulting 
from such arrangements is recorded as interest i.ncome when it is earned. 
At December 31, 1987. Lincoln Srnngs had outstanding unfunded lo:m commitments of approximately S 5!'.".f6-;.000 
ind uding S 30U69.000 of!oo.ru in process. 
The chmge in allowance for posSible loan losses IS sumnunzed as foil.ow'i: 
(In thouSl!lds) 
Balance :at beginning of penod . . . . . . . . . . . 
Additional reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ourge·offi; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
lledasSJfic::ation to other resern c:uegones 








CORPORATION AJID SUBSIDIARIE.S 
esw.e a.cq'.li.red throogh fored~ure 











lme.."tS! expense inc:urrerl oo real esu.tt is expensed until ql12lifying development :taivities are in pl'tnS$ at whidi time 
l.ntel"t'>t is then capi!J.l.i.ud The Company capit.al.l.red in~rest re!.ating Ul o::mtinuing operations of S6SMl6JX)O, S6U28J)OO 
·~·.;;"""""""" m 1987, 1986 and 198'5. ~· RaJ esute ~nts are swat at the lower of o::r.t 01' ~market 
'"'-'"'u"'"' recognizes income from real dU1e sales in 2.CCOrd:ima: with Sta.t.ement of f~Jl.:Ulru.~ Acl:oonting Sun-
~ at beginning or period 
Additioru!J reserves 
ilerJ.ass.illcuions from other reserve c:uegones 










J 200 S380 
8,275 260 
(440) 
S8.475 S200 -- --
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lOftS TO CO~SOUOAT'ED 
f!.V.NClAL STATt.~IE:flS 
U) SAVINGS DEPOSITS 
AMERlCAN CONTINENTAL 
CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARIES 
Savings deposits :md we~ghted aver;ge intel'l$ r.t~e:s at Dectmber 31. 00 :md 1986 are~ as follows: 
(In lboosands) 1987 1986 
late ~t ~.au Passbook .................................... 5.50% i 43,985 5.50% NOW accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. - ..... ~ . ~ .. ~ . " . 5.20 110,745 5.21 Money rnarlcet savings accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.37 354.882 5.60 
509.612 
Certificates: 
Retail . . . . . . . .............. - ........... 9.48 2,730.884 9.98 )umbo ...... ' ........................... 7.95 134.035 i.73 
2.864.919 
890% 13.374.531 9.17 ~~ 
Maturities of sa\ings certificates :ue Surtunarized as follows: 
1988 ................................................... . 
1989 .................................................. . 
1990 .... '.' ''' .................................... . 
1991 ' ' ..............•.......................... ' ..... ' .. 
1992 ' ... ' ' ............. ' ................. ' 
















CORPORATION AND Sl.JBSIDIARIES 
Securities sold under agreementS to ~ secu.-ed by US. 1'rea.smy oblip.ioos and GNMA 
cenifiOteS. interest at 6.8'1'5% to 85% ... > •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
M.ar&in borrowing;, !eCUred by rorporaJ:e stocks and bonds. inte.1!SI. a 9.00 "!. 1.0 9 25% . . . 
N<xes pl~Yable to b:m.k.s under revolvi.ng Unes of aed.lt, ~by 100~ 
oo real esu.tund ooteS receM.ble, interest from ptime + Y!% 1.0 prime +2% ...... . 
Note p2Yable to b2.nk under revolving linf of credit, ~ interest at prime+ l'lz % 
Commeroal paper. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 
At December 31.. 1987, ~ shon·term borrowings were secured by SS59l2UIOO of~ 
1226,995 s 
95,043 19.002 
32,631 36. ~9-t 
10,000 7,000 
At December 31.. 1987 and 1986, compensating b:ibnce ~t.s ~ S60a000 :md S2,084.000, respecuveh 
Outstanding bal:mces :md the ~ weighted average inte"t!St me on short-tmn borrowings are summ.anzed ~ foUov.;. 
' Ye~r~nd bal.a.nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. . 
Ye~r-end weighted Mr:&ge interest raJ:e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mrutimum amount outsUnding auny month-end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Avenge amount oul.$l.a.Oding (total of month~nd out.SUnding balance!l 
divided by 12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . 
'Wetghted ~rage mterest r21:e (monthlv wt~ghted ~interest r2l:l! u.rtleS 










s 73.7% s 10-.-169 
10.-:'9 °'u 9.·G ", 
S35;,5-t1 S\12.1.'3 
S!OS.-!08 s 88 -\.H 
b O'i "., i'i '0 ·, 
000180 
ll(JTES TO COSSOUDATED 
fi~A!'iC!A.L STATEME:-ITS 
(L) LONG-TER.\t DEBT Long-~nn debt is s:urnmmzerl as foilOW'S: 
(In thousands) 
Bonds pzy2ble, ~by mo~~ cmif~atr:S md first mo~ lo;w. 
uw:uriaes from 1999 to xns. in~ from u% ro 1-L"'S% . • . ............ . 
Senior noteS and debenl'lll'eS, due 1990 3M Dll., net of ww:oortized 
discounts of H9S4 in f7ID and SU,34S in 1986. in~ from !1175'· to 12% ..... 
Colliuer-.illzed tloaling l'31e note~, ~by ~ s«urtlies., due 1999. immst 
payable seml-mnll:llly :.u UBOR +'Is'¥. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
Colhleral!zed fi021ing l'31e note~, ~by im'estment :sewrities. due 1995. intmst 
pzy2ble q~rly :.u UI!OR +'Is% (7.62'5~ :uDea:mber 31, !98i) ........... . 
Collater-.illzed llo:uing rate notes, secu:rerl by irm:stment s«mities, due m., interest 
p:zy2b!e semi-annually :.u l..IBOR +Ys% (81'5% at!Ject.mber 31. 1987) .•....... 
ColL1teral!zed fi.Xed rate notes, secured by ~t securities, due 1992. 
~31. 
s 87 s 371.09! 
6!.00() 
HlO,OOO IOO.OCXl 
interest :.u 4.87'5% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.0 2 3 
NoteS p:ayable, secured by real esute, payable on vmoos lhtes to 1999, interest from 
7.00% to !5.00% ....................................... . 
fe{ier.zl Home l.mn Sank A.dvances.. ~by ~t securities md mortg:<ge loans 
rettivable, due !994. interest :.u 1299% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Senior subordin:u.ed noteS, net of un.amol11zed discoum of m4 in 1987 
and S S42 in 1986, due 1995, interest :.u 14.1'5% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Subordifl21f debentures, m:.uunties from 1988to 'f1!7, interest 
from 8.1'5% to 1200% . . . . . 
Employee Stock Ownership P\:m noteS. securerl by ~t secunues. "'''2r<:~m"'"" 
by the Company :md a subslliiary of the Compmy (Note Q), interest at vmable rates 
(5.49% at December 31, 198i), Ff-able on vmoos lhtes to 1995 ...... . 
Other, secured by real estate :md property, :md eqwpmem. i~em securiues, 
and cash eqUJvalem.s. on V'3.!"!!U.S lhtes ro !)(!'), interest 
from ':'.25% to 15.00% . 
















CORPORATION AND SUBSIDI.A.RlES 
At December 31, 00. ~te lolll!·term cidlt was~ by $935.608»00 of :weu. 
The Senior No~ and Dd:lenrum ~ of or ~or. ~ Notes, due l. !990. md S49.819.000 of 
Dd:lentl.!reS due 200L The Notts and Dd:lenru.~ m ~It :n the of the C,,O:tp3!f\', in whole or m 
pan, my l:ime after issuaru::e, :n pu. There m oo fund ~ req~nmnmts for the Senior Notes or 
lldlentul'e'S. 
The Subordinate Debent'U.reS ronsist of dd:!enwres ~ in smes by the ~ with vmoos principal balances. 
Interest r:nes and m.writie!. S92,627J)OO principal m!OW'lt 1:w been ~M:d in IS sma Paymem of principal wd interest on 
the Subol'dirl:ut Oebenwres is subordim!ed and subject w the plior ~tin full of all smim indeb~...s. as defined. of 
\AJ'l£ljT&lr. The Subord.imte Debentures m c:illablt :&1 the option of the Cootp:my on or wr May 1. f%7 at pnces 
l!-mm,;,from 104.5% tO par. 
The Company nuy not (1) dedm or ~ my dividend on its c:zpit.a.l SI.Od (other th:lll dMdends or distributions pavlhie 
in its StOCk), or (2) purchase, redeem or otherwise acquire or mire :my of its apit.a.l SI.Od if the ~ :unoom 
expended for all such purposes ~uent w june 30, 1983 ~ the sum 2S% of !be ~te ronsolid.aled net 
Income of the Company ~nt to June 30, 1983 :IIIIi the~ net me Compam· from the 
issue or s-ale or capital stock of the Company. At ~ 3l, 1987. the Company bad 1429.000 p:nment of 
div11iend£. 
00. ap~y S439POO,OOO of!ofJi·lm!:! The net after 
w g:Un o! SUi'S.OOO resulled from the favorable ra.!e:5 :11 whlch the debt was~ This pin Ius been dassified as 
m extr:wrdl.rw)· item in the ConsolJd.1ted Swements of Operations. 
At December 31. '$81. !.he Company wtth an aggregate 
principal bm.nce of noo,ooo.ooo. Thele ~ments for a~e faed in~ payments of lODl%. ln 
return the Company reci'!M:s vari2ble intereSt r:are payments lr..sed on !be London lnrerbmk Offering !tate (L!BOR) The;e 
~ments m secured by ill't'eStment !'i4l!CUntid totaling S2U48,000. In August 1987, the consumrr.ated mterest 
""""''""'~~" agrmnems with mother entity ("counter pmy") C~:~Vmng !Wlilil:le$ tot:liing Si'i,OOO.OOO whereb\ the 
"""""u"'"' pm vari2ble intereSt rates based on UBO!t The counter parry (l2Y5 a weipu:d avmge fiXed rate of 9.'i0 a~ The 
~ments m ~by US. Treasury securities of $15.063.000 and ll'l.aWI'I! in 1996 :111d 'fR/. 
1986. the Company entered imo intereSt r:are cap~ Cll'Vmfli !iabilitie$ ~ng $200£00.000. The 
'UU!lllu ... ,,. p2ld m inltilll fee of S4,900,000, and is to be reimbursed to the extent th:n UBOI exceeds 10%. The fee ~as 
de! erred md is being 2m0n:i.l:ed. using !.he Str.~.tght line method. until mrunty in l99L 
Dunng 1987, !.he Company entered intO a currency swap ~nt in coonecnon with the collium.li:zed fixed rate notes 
The coonter parry to !.he ~t will pay the Comp:my i6!..687,500 yen in August 1988 :llld will pav the Compan\ 
!:'m,-'~~.~V~J yen t.htwg.h 1991 and ~yen in August 1992 Thi!Companv pm to the rotmterpar.• 
through 1992 and S2l.6l6.9U in~ 1992. All fees tmd and received ue deferred :u:d 
the method unul !IWUtity in 1992. The ~nt secured b\ tm·estmem 
F-16 00182.. 
TO CONSOUDATID 
fl!'lA.NCIAI. STATL"fE. 'ITS 
IETA.INt.D EARNINGS 
(N) PREFER.RED STOCK 




annum to S4. 44 per 
this Preimed Stock. 
Dll.l'ing 1987, the f nmmnv 
convertible 21 any time, 
theopoon 
to par. The liqu;~on "'"''"'"P"""' 
incre:umg to the gm:.er of 
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Discontinued • • • < •• ~ • 
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-Warrant Agreement dated August 1, 1983 between the Company and Drexel 
Burnham Lambert !ncoriNrated. Incorporated reference to Exhibit 4.2 to 
~9~~~t.r~:i~~. ~~~t~~·e·n~ .. ·.o: .~-~~~~~·. ~~. ~~~. ~i~h. -~~ _s~~- ~~. ~~l·y· _1 ~: 
-Indenture dated as of August 1, 1983 between and Security 
Pacific National Bank, as Trustee. Incorporated by to Exhibit 4.1 
to Registration Statement No. 2·85222, as with the SEC on July 
1983 ..............................•..............•.......... 
-Amendment No. 1 to the Indenture dated as of February 6, 1985, between 
the Registrant, as Issuer, and Security Pacific National Bank, as 
Trustee .................................................... . 
-Statement re computation of per share earnings .................... . 
-Statement re computation of ratio of earnings to fixed charges and ratio 
earnings to fixed charges without savings deposits ................... . 
-List of Subsidiaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. . 
-Consent of Independent Public Accountants for 1987 and 1986 ........ . 
-Consent of Independent Public Accountants 1985. . ............ . 
-Report of Independent Public Accountants on Schedules for 1985 ...... . 
-1987 Financial Statement Schedules ............................ . 
Schedule !-Marketable Securities 
Schedule II-Amounts Receivable from Related Parties and Underwriters, 
Promoters, and Employees Other than Related Parties. 
Schedule Ill-Condensed Financial Information of Registrant 
Schedule VII-Guarantees of Securities of Other Issuers 
Schedule VIII-Valuation and Qualifying Accounts 
Schedule X-Supplementary Income Statement Information. 
Registrant has omitted instruments with to long-term debt of and its 
subsidiaries where the total amount of securities authorized thereunder does not exceed 10 percent of 
the total assets of Registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated Registrant agrees to furnish a 
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for passing article Grant's Interest Rate 
on American Corporation (" 
Continental"). 
the questions previous 
might want to know what 
that article anC. 
, I thought you 
our recent that 
corpor 
I think I told you that American Continental had filed an 
application for qualification by coordination to sell an 
additional $ 0,000,000 of debentures~ reviewing the 
application in detail and contacting a of other state and 
federal agencies with regulatory oversight American 
Continental or its Lincoln Savings and Loan 
subsidiary { 11 Lincoln Savings") , we granted the 
May 26, 1988. One of the primary reasons for 
ication on 
result was the 
American Continental that it would 
both principal and interest on its 
s and on the additional debentures. 
to make 
outstanding 
Our contacts with other regulatory agencies were quite extensive. 
We received materials from and had discussions the Federal 
Horne Loan Bank of San , the Herne Loan Bank Beard 
in , D.C. , t:he Department of and Loan 
(including Bill Crawford, Bi Davis and Tommy Mar, an examine~ 
working on Lincoln Savings) and the Securities and Exchange 
Although these agencies begun 
investigations or raised issues concerning Continental 
or Savings, none or 
substantiated any claims which have of 
Continental's application. 
We took all of the issues raised by other agencies 
seriously. We discussed these issues as as others 
A.'nerican Continental (other issues arose our review 
of the application and of various newspaper concerning 
Amer Continental, t:he one you sent to me) . Where 
we raised or reiterated a concrete concern Arner 
was able t:o provide ormation or otherwise make 
its app belie'Je is 
because, in an app 00019 
.. 
.. 
JANICE ROGERS BROWN 
Subject: AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION 
June 15, 1988 
Page 2 
coordination, the Department of Corporations can deny the 
application only if the Department can find that the denial is 
the public interest and that the proposed business of the issuer 
or the proposed issuance or sale of securities is not , just 
and equitable. Based upon our analysis and understanding of 
facts and circumstances surrounding the application, we could not 
make such a finding. 
If you would like a little more detail on the extent and 
particulars of our review, you may wish to read the attached 
memorandum from Jerry Baker to me. 
WS:ad 




To JANICE ROGERS BROWN 
Deputy Secretary 
Business, Transportation and 
Housing Agency 
1120 N Street, Room 2101 
Sacra~ento, California 95814 
Date : August 16, 1989 
File No.: 
Subject: 
from Department of Corporations 
615 s. Flower Street 
Los Angeles, California 90017 
Attached is the memorandum we discussed concerning American 
Continental Corporation, Lincoln Savings and Loan Association 
("Lincoln") and the problems defined by the recent review of 
Lincoln's accounting practices by Kenneth Leventhal & Company. 
I~~ediately preceding that memorandum is an Executive Summary of 
its explicit and implicit conclusions. 
'.1~ 
WAYNE SIMON 




cc: John Sullivan, Undersecretary 
000194. 
EXECUTIVE SUMri'.A.."tY 
Kenneth Leventhal & Company ("Leventhal") recently issued a 
report on the accounting practices Lincoln Savings and Loan 
Association ("Lincoln"). That report indicates how Lincoln and 
its parent, American Continental Corporation ("ACC"), were able 
to thwart effective regulation through a combination the 
recalcitrance of former management in cooperating with 
regulators, the use or abuse of technically correct but 
substantively wrong accounting principles, use of a holding 
company structure, and various other factors. 
The hostility between ACC's management and government regulators 
is well documented. The Leventhal clearly indicates 
complexity treatment that ACC and Lincoln 
intended for various real estate transactions. 
Leventhal required months to fully just 15 
transactions--and could review those only after the 
former management of Lincoln was removed by the Federal Horne Loan 
Bank Board {"the FHLBB")--illustrates the fact that no regulator 
could have carried out an effective audit of Lincoln when prior 
management was in place. 
These problems extended 
Lincoln was ACC's major 
apparent profitability 
not only to Lincoln but also to ACC. 
asset, the driving force behind ACC's 
cash flow. By thwarting effective 
audits of Lincoln state and savings and loan 




practices so soundly 
just as ly any 
position by state and 
The net result of all of the b~-uptcy of ACC and 
the FHLBB's takeover Mare tragic have been the 
effects on depositors whose have been disrupted and on the 
23,000 purchasers of ACC debentures who may lose some or all of 
their investment. 
000195 
• :stc:te {.ti California 
Memorandum 
To Dote 
JANICE ROGERS BROWN 
Deputy Secretary File No.: 
Business, Trdnsportation and Housing Agency 
Office of the Secretary Subject, 
1120 N Street, Suite 2101 
Sacramento, California 95814 





From Department of Corporations 
WAYNE SIMON 
Chief Deputy Commissione~ 
! recently received a 10-page summary of the Kenneth Leventhal & 
Company ("Leventhal") review of 15 selected real estate 
transactions involving Lincoln Savings and Loan Association 
("Lincoln"}. That review illustrates the extreme difficulty 
experienced by the Department of Corporations--and, I assume, the 
Department of Savings and Loan, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and other government 
regulators--in reviewing materials submitted by American 
Continental Corporation ("ACC") and/or Lincoln. 
The Leventhal summary repeatedly indicates that ACC, Lincoln and 
their outside accountants were quite familiar with the accounting 
principles and standards applicable to the real estate 
transactions. Further, the summary clearly indicates that, 
although ACC, Lincoln and their advisers carefully followed the 
technicalities of those principles and standards, they did so 
wi regard to the substantive treatment that should have 
applied. 
I think all of this is quite relevant to the criticisms that have 
been leveled against our Department for not stopping the offer 
and sale of ACC debentures prior to ACC's bankruptcy filing. ACC 
filed a verified application for qualification of the securities 
together with audited financial statements prepared by an 
independent certified public accounting firm. The Department 
had, on the face of those materials, no reason to doubt their 
veracity and significant reason to assume that all of the 
information in those materials was truthful--misrepresentations 
or omissions in those materials, whether wilful or inadvertent, 
could subject the issuer, its directors, officers, employees and 
, and the accountants to administrative, civil or criminal 
proceedings for violation of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 
("the CSL"). 
Despite the propriety of the documents filed with us on their 
face and the incentive for accuracy and truthfulness set forth in 
the CSL, the Department still did quite an intensive review of 
all of those materials. We were never able to come up with any 
evidence of misstatements or improprieties. The Leventhal report 
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